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CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN TAXATION: DECEIT, DETERRENCE, AND THE 
SELF-ADJUSTING PENALTY 
Alex Raskolnikov* 
Avoidance and evasion continue to frustrate the government’s efforts to 
collect much needed tax revenues.  This article articulates one of the reasons 
for this lack of success and proposes a new type of penalty that would 
strengthen tax enforcement while improving efficiency.  The economic 
analysis of deterrence suggests that rational taxpayers choose among 
various avoidance or evasion strategies that are subject to identical statutory 
sanctions those that are more difficult for the government to find.  I argue 
that many taxpayers do just that.  Because probability of detection varies 
dramatically among different items on a tax return while nominal penalties 
do not take likelihood of detection into account, expected penalties for 
inconspicuous noncompliance are particularly low.  Adjusting existing 
penalties will not solve the problem because what is (and is not) 
inconspicuous depends on a given tax return and, therefore, is not 
susceptible to the type of generalization on which the current penalties rely.  
I propose to complement the existing sanctions with a new penalty equal to a 
fraction of the legitimate subtraction item (such as a deduction, credit, or 
loss) reported on the same line of a return that contains the illegitimate one.  
With this penalty in place, the harder it is for the government to find a given 
avoidance transaction, the higher is the statutory sanction if the transaction 
is detected.  The proposed penalty adjusts itself.  As a result, the differences 
in expected penalties for many forms of avoidance and, to a lesser extent, 
evasion are reduced, the inefficient incentive to hide noncompliance is 
diminished, and the overall deterrence is improved. 
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I. Introduction 
One (and, perhaps, the only) good thing about tax avoidance is that it unites theoretically-
inclined academics, hard-nosed practitioners, and result-oriented government officials like few 
other issues do.  Virtually all of them believe that there is too much tax avoidance today.1  
Agreeing on what should be done about this is another matter. 
This article makes two contributions to the tax avoidance debate.  First, it identifies a 
significant weakness of the existing tax enforcement regime.  Second, it sketches several potential 
responses, focusing in particular on a penalty of a new type.  The analysis and proposal are 
grounded in the economic approach to deterrence.  In its most basic form, this approach suggests 
that taxpayers contemplating whether or not to engage in tax avoidance take into account 
expected rather than nominal penalties.  That is, they discount nominal penalties set forth in the 
Internal Revenue Code by the probability that these penalties will be imposed, a probability that 
is demonstrably lower than one. 
The existing nominal penalties for tax avoidance fail to take into account variations in 
probability detection.  Yet this probability differs widely among various avoidance techniques, 
making expected penalties for some strategies significantly lower than for others.  Taxpayers 
recognize the disparity and, if they decide to engage in tax avoidance at all, tend to choose the 
type of avoidance that, to put it bluntly, is harder to find. 
                                                     
1
 See, e.g., George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 Tax Notes 1449, 1449 (2005) (stating 
that “[a]ny consideration of major tax reform in this country must give priority consideration to issues of 
tax compliance and enforcement.”); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L.R. 215, 
228 (2002) (noting that “the explosion of tax shelters is considered by many to be one of the most pressing 
problems facing our [tax] system today.”); Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax 
Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 Tax Notes 221, 230 (2000) (“The Treasury has argued, and many 
practitioners agree, that at present we face a crisis in which undesirable transactions that would 
undoubtedly be shut down on detection (even if they work under current law) are compromising the entire 
corporate income tax, and perhaps generating broader disrespect for the tax system.”).  The Government 
Accountability Office believes that tax enforcement is one of the high-risk areas, see Allen Kenney, Tax 
Enforcement Makes GAO’s 2005 List of “High-Risk” Areas, 106 Tax Notes 531, 531 (2005) (“Given the 
broad declines in IRS’s enforcement workforce, IRS’s decreased ability to follow up on suspected 
noncompliance, the emergence of sophisticated evasion concerns, and the unknown effect of these trends 
on voluntary compliance, IRS is challenged on virtually all fronts in attempting to ensure that taxpayers 
fulfill their obligations.”). 
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This strategy is difficult to counter because the opportunity to conceal is unique to each 
taxpayer.  A questionable deduction that is all but invisible on one tax return will raise an obvious 
red flag on another.  The problem is not with the particular type of deduction, but, in large part, 
with the way it fits with the rest of the taxpayer’s return.  The current penalty regime makes 
virtually no attempt to address this problem, focusing instead on transactions that all taxpayers 
are, on average, more likely to use to reduce their tax liabilities. 
This article suggests an alternative approach.  I argue that the government should counter 
taxpayers’ incentives to conceal by creating nominal penalties that would vary inversely with the 
changes in probability of detection.  If a nominal penalty prescribed in the statute is set to be 
relatively high for the strategies that are harder to detect, it will offset a relatively low probability 
of detection, resulting in more uniform expected penalties, weaker incentives to conceal, and 
more effective deterrence. 
I propose a new type of penalty that would accomplish this goal for a fairly wide 
(although limited) set of avoidance techniques that use various subtractions from gross income 
(such as losses, deductions, and credits) to reduce tax liability.  The key insight is that subtraction 
items that are likely to raise questions on audit generally fall in one of two categories: they are 
either unusual for the taxpayer’s business or personal situation or they involve a drastic change in 
an otherwise typical item on a return.  The opposite is also true: deductions, credits, and losses 
that are neither atypical nor significantly changed are less likely to invite additional scrutiny.  
Therefore, if a rational risk-minimizing taxpayer looks for an avoidance strategy that will be 
relatively difficult to detect, she is likely to choose the one using those subtractions that are 
already present on her return, and that are present in a substantial amount. 
For example, a suburban lawyer who has decided to overstate her deductions by $1,000 
would probably choose to claim an extra $1,000 charitable deduction in addition to an 
appropriately claimed $10,000 charitable deduction already present on her return rather than 
taking a $1,000 farm loss that she has never claimed before.  A ten percent increase in charitable 
deductions is less likely to attract auditor’s attention than an inexplicable farm loss, so the 
probability of detection, and, therefore, the expected future payment, is lower for the former 
strategy. 
If this suggestion about variations in probability of detection is correct (even if only in 
part), we can raise nominal penalties for hard-to-detect strategies without knowing what they are 
in advance.  We can do this by linking the statutory penalty for avoidance using a particular 
credit, deduction, or loss to the legitimate subtraction item of the same type on the return.  That is, 
the tax avoider (such as the lawyer) would be denied not only the tax item claimed 
inappropriately (the $1,000 charitable deduction), but a fraction of the perfectly legitimate 
subtraction claimed on the same line of her tax return as well (e.g., 10 percent of the $10,000 
charitable deduction). 
The main strength of the proposed penalty—and its fundamental difference from any tax 
penalty existing today—is that it adjusts itself.  If a taxpayer’s avoidance strategy generates a 
deduction that has not appeared on her prior returns and is atypical for her business or personal 
circumstances, the strategy is more likely to be detected.  The proposed nominal penalty in this 
case would be zero, however, because the total amount of the deduction and the amount of the 
improperly claimed deduction are the same.  On the other hand, if a taxpayer inappropriately 
overstates a deduction that is and has been present on her return in a substantial amount, the 
overstatement would be much harder to find.  However, the proposed self-adjusting penalty in 
this case would be significantly higher.  As a result, the expected penalties for the two strategies 
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become much closer than they are today, the payoff from hiding tax avoidance is reduced, and the 
overall deterrence is improved, all without any additional effort by the enforcement agency. 
Many alternative nominal penalties may be devised based on the same fundamental 
insight.  The self-adjusting penalty may be equal to the entire legitimate subtraction item of a type 
used in the avoidance arrangement, a fraction of that amount, or its multiple.  It may or may not 
take taxpayer’s fault into account.  It may apply to all forms of avoidance and evasion, or only 
those using particular deductions, credits, or losses.  It may be fine-tuned in many different ways, 
giving the government significant flexibility in influencing taxpayers’ decisions.  Whatever form 
of the proposed penalty is adopted, the self-adjusting penalty is likely to improve tax compliance 
without consuming a lot of government resources while imposing relatively modest costs on most 
taxpayers. 
In addition to identifying and resolving a systemic flaw in the current enforcement 
regime, this article aims to narrow the divide between the economic analysis of tax 
noncompliance and the general deterrence scholarship.   From street gangs to corporate 
malefactors, from environmental violations to common law torts, scholars have considered how 
to deter all types of offenses based on rigorous economic analysis.2  In addition to a considerable 
literature focused on formal modeling,3 these inquiries have generated a spirited debate about the 
types and magnitudes of real-life sanctions.  Are monetary fines always more cost-effective than 
incarceration?4  Could criminal penalties efficiently deter corporate misdeeds, or would only civil 
sanctions reach this goal?5  Should we set punitive damages by taking into account variations in 
probability of detection,6 by aiming to deny the benefits of the offense to the violator,7 or in some 
                                                     
2
 The foundational work is Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. 
Econ. 169 (1968).  For its wide-reaching implications, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW (2002); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of 
Law, 38 J. Econ. Lit. 45 (2000). 
3
 See infra, text accompanying notes 37-52. 
4
 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. Leg. Stud. 609, 615-
17 (1998) (arguing with an established view that civil sanctions are more cost-effective than imprisonment 
expressed, for example, in Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 409, 410-11 (1980)). 
5
 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 4, at 618-622 (demonstrating why criminal corporate liability may be 
efficient, disagreeing with Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Leg. Stud. 319 
(1996) and V. S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 
1477 (1996)). 
6
 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L.R. 
869, 874 (1998). 
7
 See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L.J. 421, 456 
(1998). 
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other fashion?8  Institutional detail, expressive function of the law, and cognitive biases play 
important roles in these debates.9 
In contrast, formal models of tax noncompliance have largely ignored the task of 
analyzing the optimal structure of nominal penalties.  Leading scholars have recognized this 
deficiency,10 but lack of attention continues.  Furthermore, while tax academics have successfully 
used sophisticated public finance models to scrutinize current and proposed substantive anti-tax 
shelter doctrines,11 economic analysis of deterrence has remained mostly divorced from the 
complexities and idiosyncrasies of actual tax enforcement.  As a result, both the theoretical 
analysis of tax penalties and its application to the sanctions that exist (or should exist) today trail 
similar inquiries in most other areas of the law by a wide margin.  This article begins the process 
of bridging this gap. 
The remainder of the article consists of five parts.  Part II introduces the tax avoidance 
problem and economic approach to deterrence.  Part III identifies a critical flaw of the existing 
enforcement regime.  Part IV considers and rejects several possible responses and set forth the 
proposal.  Following the discussion of the proposal’s key features in Part V, Part VI addresses 
some of the likely objections.  Part VII concludes. 
II. Tax Noncompliance: the Problem, the Causes, the Economic Analysis 
1. Many Facets of Tax Avoidance 
Each year, the government collects over $300 billion less in taxes than it believes it 
should.12  This shortfall—the so-called tax gap—is not only large, but it has nearly tripled over 
                                                     
8
 See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347, 363 (2003) 
(expressing a view that while economic deterrence is one of the important goals of punitive damages, it is 
not their exclusive goal). 
9
 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages, The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 
Mich. L. Rev. 2185, 2219-38 (1998) [hereinafter, The Multiplier Principle] (discussing, inter alia, 
institutional issues, practical constraints, and symbolic and expressive effects of various penalties aimed at 
approximating optimal deterrence); Kahan, supra note 4 (focusing on the expressive function of sanctions); 
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, 893-94, 957-62 (addressing potential responses to jury biases, offering 
detailed jury instructions). 
10
 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are 
Undesirable, 12 Int’l Rev. L. Econ. 3, 9 (1992) [hereinafter, Fines for Undesirable Acts] (noting that “it 
seems inappropriate when analyzing optimal enforcement policy simply to assume, as is commonly done, 
that the fine is fixed at some stated level . . . .”); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement 
and Evasion, 43 J. Pub. Econ. 221, 234 (1990) (acknowledging that the effect of penalty structure on tax 
enforcement has not been considered in most studies of tax noncompliance, including his own); Frank A. 
Cowell, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION 174, 228 n.18 (1990) (remarking that 
the structure of tax penalties is the “subject [that] is relatively neglected in the literature.”). 
11
 See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 1, at 237-44 (discussing the implications of the marginal efficiency cost of 
funds model); David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4 Am. Law 
Econ. Rev. 88, 92-99 (2002) (relying on the compensated elasticity of taxable income analysis). 
12
 See Allen Kenney, New IRS Estimates Show Slight Widening of Tax Gap, 107 Tax Notes 7, 7 (2005).  
This is a number reflecting voluntary tax payments.  After the government’s collections efforts it is reduced 
to about $250 billion, see id. 
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the past two decades and continues to grow.13  Furthermore, the gap is just one of several signs of 
a serious tax compliance problem.  We are in the midst of a well-publicized tax shelter crisis.  
Large and well-known companies see their tax planning strategies struck down as devious tax 
shelters and sometimes are forced to pay penalties on top of the tax they had hoped to avoid.14  
An attempt by an all-American manufacturer to reincorporate in a tax haven is thwarted by 
outrage on Capitol Hill, a law suit by the state attorney general, and popular protest.15  
Disenchanted wealthy tax shelter investors turn against their former advisers.  As a result, some 
of the nation’s largest investment banks, accounting firms, and law firms are facing numerous law 
suits, including class actions.16  The Treasury department makes tax shelters one of its top 
priorities and issues a set of regulations that reach far beyond any previous anti-avoidance 
measures.17  Finally, Congress lends a hand to the Treasury’s efforts by significantly raising 
penalties for tax shelter participants and promoters, in some cases to the tune of $10,000 a day.18 
While the tax shelter crisis is perhaps the most visible side of the tax compliance 
problem, it is almost certainly not the most costly one.  According to many estimates, the largest 
portion of the tax gap is due to underreporting of income by small businesses and self-employed 
individuals, most of which falls under the rubric of tax evasion.19  Detecting and quantifying this 
evasion is notoriously difficult because it mainly involves understating of cash receipts.  Unlike 
deductions and credits that appear on returns and must be substantiated if questioned, cash 
receipts may not be reflected in any set of records.  As a result, small business owners and 
household workers have the lowest level of tax compliance, perhaps as low as 51 percent for 
nonfarm proprietor income and 13 percent for informal supplier income.20  A recent report 
attributes 67 percent of the tax gap to this type of evasion.21  In sum, wherever opportunities to 
                                                     
13
 The gap was estimated at $90 billion for 1981, see Jonathan Skinner & Joel Slemrod, An Economic 
Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 Nat’l Tax J. 345, 345 (1985).  It has been growing at about 15% annual rate 
in the decade preceding 1981, see id.  When adjusted for inflation, the rate of growth is lower.  The 
precision of the tax gap estimate is open to question, however, see, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. 
Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy, 38 Nat’l L.J. 355, 355 (1985) (explaining 
why estimating tax noncompliance is “fraught with difficulties”). 
14
 See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L.R. 255, 256-57 
(2002) (describing the court losses of several major U.S. companies). 
15
 See, e.g., Stacey Stowe, Stanley Works Decides to Stay Put After All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at C1; 
see also Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 Nat’l Tax J. 877, 883 (2004) 
[hereinafter Corporate Selfishness] (citing statement by Sen. Grassley that reincoporations of U.S. 
companies in tax havens are “immoral”). 
16
 See, e.g., Susan Simmonds, Shelter Cases Highlight Uncertain Outcomes, 106 Tax Notes 45 (2005). 
17
 See infra, Part III.2 for a discussion of these regulations. 
18
 See I.R.C. § 6708. 
19
 Low-income proprietors are estimated to be the least compliance group of taxpayers, see, e.g., Kurt J. 
Beron et. al., The Effect of Audits and Socioeconomic Variables on Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY 
TAXES, TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 67, 86-87 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (hereinafter, WHY 
PEOPLE PAY TAXES). 
20
 See Joel Slemrod, Small Business and the Tax System, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 69, 84 
(Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) [hereinafter, Small Business]. 
21
 See Heather Bennett, IRS Must Get Grip on Tax Gap, Taxpayer Advocate Says, 106 Tax Notes 531 
(2005). 
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avoid or evade taxes present themselves, quite a few taxpayers of all stripes are eager to take 
advantage. 
2. Why Do People Pay Taxes? 
The discussion so far may be viewed as suggesting that an all-out assault on tax 
noncompliance is long overdue.  It is not, at least not necessarily.  To combat noncompliance one 
needs to understand why it exists.  Why do people pay taxes?  Why do they evade?  No single 
theory has all the answers. 
The economic approach to deterrence was introduced in the modern literature by Gary 
Becker22 and it goes back to writings of Bentham23 and Beccaria.24  It suggests that potential 
offenders take into account not just the size of the possible penalty, but also the likelihood that the 
penalty will be imposed.  Several models have been developed to describe taxpayers’ behavior 
based on these assumptions.25  Unfortunately, the models fail to explain the “abnormally” high 
level of tax compliance given the exceedingly low expected penalties, leaving scholars wondering 
why people pay as much in taxes as they do.26 
If the economic analysis does not fully explain tax compliance, what does?  Perhaps, 
looking at human beings as more than mere “rational rats”27 may provide the answer.  Dan Kahan 
and others have argued that cultural and social factors play an important role in tax compliance, 
possibly more important than the threat of punishment.  Taxpayers pay taxes, these scholars 
assert, to avoid feelings of guilt, shame, and peer condemnation accompanying tax evaders, 
because they value cooperation and believe that others are law-abiding taxpayers, and because 
they feel pride fulfilling their civic duty.28  On the other hand, those who think that tax laws are 
                                                     
22
 Becker, supra note 2. 
23
 See id., at 185 n.31 (citing Bentham). 
24
 See id., at 176, n.12 (citing Beccaria). 
25
 See infra, text accompanying notes 57-71. 
26
 See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 1, at 243 (“Perhaps the most surprising fact about tax shelters is that there 
is not more sheltering. . . .  It is not clear, given the wide variety of shelters, why any business pays tax at 
all.”); Graetz & Wilde, supra note 13, at 358 (“Application of the standard economic theory of crime to 
[many] tax avoidance cases . . . produces an unambiguous prediction: throughout the 1970s no one should 
have paid the taxes they owed . . . .”).  In part, tax withholding rules help most salaried employees to avoid 
unnecessary temptations by putting their employers in charge of collecting and remitting employees’ taxes 
to the government.  As a result, compliance rates for these types of income approximate 100 percent, see, 
e.g., Slemrod, Small Business, at 85.  A well-publicized system of information reporting makes hiding 
interest, dividend, certain other types of income futile as well, see id.  The system is well-understood 
because every From 1099 sent to a taxpayer reminds her that the same information is being provided to the 
IRS.  Withholding and reporting increase probability of detection for income subject to either regime to 
almost 100 percent, necessarily leading to larger expected penalties and greater compliance.  Even with 
these qualifications, however, economic models developed so far do not provide a comprehensive account 
of the actual taxpayers’ behavior. 
27
 Cowell, supra note 10, at 47. 
28
 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Actions, and Law, 81 B.U.L. Rev. 333 (2001); James 
Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 818, 850-51 (1998).  
Economists respond that such phenomena as humiliation of an audit and tax prosecution and stigma of 
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unjust, unfairly administered, or disagree with how the tax revenues are spent are more likely to 
evade.29  These arguments may have profound consequences for policymakers deciding how to 
improve tax compliance.  If they are correct, publicizing a large tax gap and a wide spread of tax 
shelters, raising penalties, or spending resources on high-profile tax prosecutions of rich and 
powerful is likely to have a negative effect on deterrence by suggesting that tax avoidance is 
commonplace and socially acceptable, even if risky.30  Finally, some scholars suggest that higher 
penalties and appeals to moral values could work in tandem, especially if they are targeted at 
different groups of taxpayers.31 
Empirical research of tax avoidance and evasion exists, but it is somewhat sparse and has 
produced inconclusive results.  Data about the actual taxpayers’ behavior, results from laboratory 
experiments, and survey information are each subject to their own limitations and imperfections, 
making any findings heavily qualified.  The most basic predictions of the economic deterrence 
model—that higher penalties and higher likelihood that the penalties would be imposed improve 
tax compliance—have not been rigorously tested.32  Several studies suggest that both factors 
enhance deterrence, but the effect is small.33  Some scholars report that rewards for being a good 
citizen and information about compliance by others work better than a threat of punishment for 
being a cheater.34  Others come to exactly opposite conclusions based on the same experimental 
data.35  Numerous surveys show that tax evasion is more prevalent among those who believe that 
they are carrying an unfairly large tax burden.36  In sum, experimental data lends some support to 
all existing theories of taxpayer behavior, while giving a decisive advantage to none. 
                                                                                                                                                              
being labeled a tax cheat are just additional costs to be taken into account in estimating expected penalties, 
see, e.g., Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 13, at 348. 
29
 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase 
Compliance?, 18 Can. J.L. Juris. 95, 97 (2005). 
30
 See Kahan, supra note 28, at 340-44. 
31
 See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1453 (2003). 
32
 See Slemrod, Corporate Selfishness, at 887. 
33
 See Andreoni et al., supra note 28, at 822, 841-42 (discussing studies and concluding that all of them 
“come with caveats,” but “present a fairly consistent picture in which both penalties and audit probabilities 
have some deterrent effect, although the magnitude of these effects is still unclear”). 
34
 See Kahan, supra note 28, at 343 (citing the results of a study by the Minnesota Department of Revenue); 
James Alm, Betty Jackson & Michael McKee, Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS, in 
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 311, 321-323 (reporting that immediate rewards produced more compliance than 
increased enforcement). 
35
 See Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax 
Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 Nat’l Tax J. 125, 131-132 (2001) 
(finding no statistically significant effects from normative appeals); Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal & 
Charles Christian, Taxpayers Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled 
Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. Pub. Econ. 455, 465 (2000) (finding that higher audit rates increased 
reported income and tax paid by low- and middle-income taxpayers, especially those with greater 
opportunities to evade). 
36
 See Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 13, at 348. 
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Clearly, more experimental data would be helpful in resolving theoretical debates.  In the 
meantime, the best one can do, it seems, is to explicitly base any proposal aimed at improving tax 
administration on one of the competing views about taxpayers’ behavior.  The proposal made in 
this article is based on the economic approach. 
3. The General Economic Analysis of Deterrence 
Modern economic analysis of deterrence starts with Gary Becker’s observation that when 
deciding whether or not to violate the law, rational utility-maximizing potential offenders take 
into account not the nominal penalties (i.e., the sanctions set by the relevant statutory provisions), 
but the expected ones.37  The difference between the two penalties arises because enforcement of 
law is less than perfect and some offenses go unpunished.  Thus, the expected penalty equals the 
nominal penalty discounted by the probability that the penalty will be imposed, or 
EP = NP x PP 
where EP is the expected penalty, NP is the nominal penalty, and PP is the probability that the 
penalty will be imposed, or probability of punishment. 
But what should this expected penalty be?  Economic theory suggests that rational agents 
would behave efficiently if they take into account full costs of their actions, not just their internal 
costs.  By equating the expected penalty for a given act to the act’s external harm we would force 
potential offenders to internalize this harm, achieving the efficient level of compliance.38  This 
insight about the optimal expected sanction leads to an elegant proposal for the size of the optimal 
nominal penalty:  it should be equal to the external harm (EH) times the reciprocal of the 
probability of punishment—the so-called “multiplier,”39 or 
NP = EH x 1/PP40 
Unfortunately, things are rarely that simple.  First, because imposition of penalties is 
costly, a portion of these costs that is not internalized by the offenders should be taken into 
account in setting expected penalties.41  In addition, the basic formula should be adjusted to 
account for risk aversion of potential offenders,42 other costs borne by them (such as attorney’s 
fees and reputational losses),43 wealth effects,44 imperfect information about likelihood of 
                                                     
37
 See Becker, supra note 2, at 176. 
38
 For a more detailed explanation, see, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 877-87. 
39
 Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J. Leg. Stud. 463, 464 (1996) 
[hereinafter, Damage Multipliers]. 
40
 If a nominal penalty is set at this level, the expected penalty would be equal to the external harm of the 
behavior being deterred: EP = NP×PP = (EH×1/PP)×PP=EH. 
41
 See Craswell, Damage Multipliers, at 470. 
42
 See Becker, supra note 2, at 178. 
43
 See Craswell, Damage Multipliers, at 465. 
44
 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among 
Individuals, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 618 (1991). 
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detection,45 existence of both monetary and non-monetary sanctions,46 interaction between 
general and specific deterrence,47 and other considerations.48  Finally, in order to reflect a 
possibility of legal error, the probability of punishing an innocent defendant should be subtracted 
from the probability of punishing a guilty one in the denominator of the multiplier.49 
Yet, even if the external harm of a given offense could be measured precisely, and if all 
adjustments could be made to determine the optimal nominal penalty, the success would be 
illusory.  The adjustment for a possibility of legal error just described is sufficient only if the error 
rate does not depend on the gravity of the offense or the innocence of a non-offending behavior.  
This assumption does not hold in many cases.  More egregious offenses are much less likely to be 
mistakenly excused than those that are barely illegal.  Completely innocent behavior is much less 
likely to be erroneously penalized than actions that come close to the line, even if they don’t cross 
it.50  Whenever error rates vary in this fashion, the only way to maintain the first best level of 
deterrence is to calculate the multiplier separately for each violation.51 
Furthermore, aside from mistaken decisions to punish or excuse, in many cases more 
serious offenses result in higher external harms (by definition) and are also more likely to be 
detected and prosecuted.  That is, both components of the expected penalty formula vary in the 
same direction as the gravity of an offense changes.  For example, consider a manufacturing plant 
that produces valuable widgets but also emits pollution, sometimes in excess of the permissible 
limit.  A more egregious environmental violation would produce a larger smoke cloud that would 
linger longer, raising probability that the violation would be detected.  The enforcement agency is 
more likely to pursue large polluters, raising probability of prosecution.  Perhaps, a judge or a 
jury would be less sympathetic to a flagrant offender, raising probability of conviction.  Any of 
these effects would increase probability of punishment for a more serious violation compared to a 
less significant one.  When this occurs, it is, again, impossible to determine a single probability of 
punishment (or a single multiplier) that will produce the optimal nominal penalty for all levels of 
a given offense.  Instead, the multiplier will need to be set taking into account the gravity of the 
harm on a case-by-case basis.52 
                                                     
45
 See Omri Ben-Shahar, Playing Without a Rulebook: Optimal Enforcement When Individuals Learn the 
Penalty Only by Committing the Crime, 17 Int. Rev. Law Econ. 409, 409-10 (1997); Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of 
Apprehension, 21 J. Leg. Stud. 365 (1992). 
46
 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. Pub. 
Econ. 89 (1984). 
47
 See Steven Shavell, Specific versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 1088 (1991). 
48
 For example, several commentators pointed out that it may be efficient to set expected penalty slightly 
below the external harm caused by the offense in question, see Craswell, Damage Multipliers, at 471, or 
slightly above that level, see id., at 472-73. 
49
 See id., at 476 (citing models). 
50
 See id., at 476-77. 
51
 See id. 
52
 See Craswell, The Multiplier Principle, at 2187-88. 
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While conceptually possible, the case-by-case multipliers detract from the versatility of 
the model and, in any case, do not appear to be a particularly realistic solution.53  In addition, they 
could lead to the arguably unjust (and politically unacceptable) result when egregious violations 
would face lower nominal penalties than marginal offenses.54  If precise deterrence is 
unattainable, what is the practical value of the expected penalty analysis? 
The answer comes from the observation that in making their decisions, individuals 
respond to the marginal changes in expected penalties and not just to their absolute values.55  For 
example, if two different offenses produce external harms of $100 and $200 respectively, the 
proper marginal deterrence will be achieved if the expected penalties are set at $300 and $400 
respectively, even though their absolute values will be clearly excessive.  Becker’s original 
observation that the expected penalty depends on the nominal penalty and the probability of 
punishment suggests that a change in the expected penalty depends on the changes in each of 
these variables.  At the same time, deterring two equally harmful offenses by subjecting them to 
equal nominal penalties may be a misguided approach.  If one offense is less likely to be punished 
than the other, having equal statutory fines for both offenses is undesirable from the marginal 
deterrence perspective. 
In sum, the ideal of optimal deterrence remains elusive.  However, achieving optimal 
marginal deterrence is a worth-wile second-best objective.56  If policymakers learn to identify 
marginal variations in external harms produced by different violations and to counter them by 
changing either the magnitude of likelihood of fines, the enforcement regime would become more 
efficient. 
4. The Economic Approach to Tax Evasion 
Starting with Becker’s observations, the early attempts to model tax evasion viewed the 
decision to evade as a choice under uncertainty, or, more technically, a gamble.57  A taxpayer 
                                                     
53
 See Craswell, Damage Multipliers, at 477 (noting that “more realistically, all offenses [of the same type] 
must be governed by the same multiplier”). 
54
 See id. 
55
 See id., at 2194.  George Stigler who is credited with coining the term “marginal deterrence” quipped 
that, when considering possible crimes, “marginal decisions are made as in the remainder of life . . . .”  
George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Polit. Economy 526, 527 (1970). 
56
 Note that the task of optimizing marginal deterrence is easier than reaching an absolute optimum because 
we don’t need to determine the absolute values of external harm—we only need to agree on how they differ 
among various offenses.  Another second-best solution is to settle for a single multiplier or a single fine.  
For an in-depth discussion, see Craswell, The Multiplier Principle, at 2198-2207. 
57
 Economic analysis of tax noncompliance focuses almost exclusively on tax evasion—an unambiguously 
illegal non-payment of taxes.  The seminal taxpayer-as-a-gambler model was offered in Michael G. 
Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 323 (1972) and 
modified in Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J. Pub. Econ. 201 
(1974).  The scholarship on the subject is vast and several excellent reviews are available, see, e.g., Joel 
Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration 1423, 1429-1438, in 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) [hereinafter, Tax 
Administration]; Andreoni et al., supra note 28, at 823-834.  The discussion follows the literature in 
focusing on tax evasion by individuals, see, e.g., Slemrod, Small Business, at 83 (“Nearly all the theoretical 
and empirical literature on tax evasion focuses on evasion by individuals.”). 
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facing known and exogenously fixed nominal penalty and probability of punishment compares 
the expected gain from tax evasion to the expected cost of tax penalties.58  The models are static: 
all taxpayer’s decisions (and, therefore, taxable income) are fixed, and possible responses by the 
tax authority are ignored.  The models suggest that if the expected value of the gamble is positive, 
taxpayers will evade all tax, and if it is negative, they will fully comply with the law.59  This 
result is modified once taxpayers’ risk aversion is taken into account.  At some point, a risk 
averse taxpayer would not undertake additional evasion despite its positive expected value 
because the size of the bet would be simply too large for her taste.60  Furthermore, if probability 
of detection grows with the size of evasion, it will not be optimal to evade all tax.61 
 Despite numerous simplifying assumptions, the consequences suggested by the static 
models are complicated and largely uncertain.  The effect of the tax rate on evasion, for example, 
depends on whether the penalty is based on income understatement or tax understatement.62  
Relative risk aversion determines the effect of the taxpayer’s income on the magnitude of 
noncompliance.63  Attempts to model the role of tax practitioners further add to the uncertainty.64  
In contrast to these ambiguous conclusions, one result is fairly clear: increases in probability of 
punishment and in nominal penalty decrease incentives to evade.65 
Dynamic models relax the unrealistic assumption that the relevant parties do not take into 
account each other’s actions.  These models treat the interaction between taxpayers and the IRS 
as a game rather than a gamble.66  The IRS tries to maximize the revenue collected, taxpayers 
respond by deciding how much income to report.  The models yield new insights, yet 
considerable uncertainty remains.67  However, an increase in nominal penalties unambiguously 
increases compliance.68 
Finally, more general models take into account that rational individuals may respond to 
taxation in two alternative ways in addition to engaging in evasion.69  First, taxpayers may change 
                                                     
58
 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax Administration, at 1430, 1451-52.  The description of this and other models 
provides only a very general summary highlighting the aspects of the literature relevant for our purposes. 
59
 See id., at 1432. 
60
 See id., at 1430. 
61
 See id., at 1432. 
62
 See id., at 1431. 
63
 See id. 
64
 See Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 Tax L. Rev. 33, 60 (1994). 
65
 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax Administration, at 1431. 
66
 First such model was proposed in Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, The Tax 
Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, 2 J. Law. Econ. & Org. 1, 1 (1986). 
67
 While relaxing some of the very strong assumptions made in the static models, the model offered by 
Graetz and others itself relies on assumptions that are unlikely to be true.  For example, the model assumes 
that taxpayers know the government’s audit strategy, the IRS has an unlimited budget, and taxpayers have 
only two levels of income, see id., at 8 n.20, 24.   Eliminating some of these assumptions dramatically 
increases complexity of the analysis, see id., at 25, 27. 
68
 See id., at 18. 
69
 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax Administration, at 1436 (citing 4 models). 
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their work effort and the types of consumption and saving decisions they make (I will refer to 
these as real responses).70  Second, they can enter into clearly legal tax minimization strategies.  
Analysis tends to focus on how such factors as tax rate and wage rate affect the taxpayer’s choice 
among evasion, legal tax minimization, and real responses, and how adopting any given type of 
response affects the other two.  The models add richness and realism to the world described by 
the more limited static and dynamic models, but this realism comes at a price of further 
complexity and uncertainty.  For example, taking into account only the possibility that, in 
addition to evasion, taxpayers may respond to taxes by reducing their work effort makes the 
effect of higher nominal penalties and stronger enforcement ambiguous.71 
In addition to being fairly indeterminate, and in stark contrast with the general deterrence 
scholarship, models of individuals’ tax compliance are entirely unconcerned with devising 
optimal expected penalties.72  This disparity is important because it is impossible to determine the 
optimal nominal penalty according to Becker’s formula without first deciding what the optimal 
expected penalty is.  Furthermore, we need to understand the reasons for this disparity in order to 
evaluate whether the theoretical framework for economic analysis of tax enforcement should be 
conceptually different from that applicable in other areas of the law. 
Perhaps, the divergence could be explained if we consider the fundamental difference 
between tax evasion and activities typically addressed by the general deterrence literature, such as 
pollution, accidents, and the like.  Returning to the widget-making plant example, note that 
pollution is an unfortunate and inevitable side effect of a socially beneficial activity—operation 
of the plant.  Tax evasion has no concomitant welfare enhancing companion.  We are concerned 
with over-deterring pollution  because this may cause the factory to under-produce.  There is no 
analogous concern with tax evasion.  In other words, while pollution (or, more precisely, the 
pollution-generating manufacturing activity) may be socially beneficial at some level, tax evasion 
never is.73  Hence, the concern for overdeterrence that looms large in the general deterrence 
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 For a more elaborate explanation of this term, see id. at 1428. 
71
 See id., at 1432. 
72
 See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 222.  While several models of optimal tax enforcement exist, they focus 
on individual elements affecting expected sanctions in a piece meal fashion, see Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax 
Administration, at 1450-1453 (discussing various models).  Thus, some researches attempt to devise 
optimal auditing rules, see, e.g., Kim Border & Joel Sobel, Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and 
Plunder, 54 Rev. Econ. Stud. 525, 525 (1987); Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis Wilde, Income Tax 
Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework, 26 J. Pub. Econ. 1, 1 (1985).  Others focus on optimal extent 
of enforcement, see, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency, 
89 Scand. J. Econ. 183, 186 n.2 (1987) (explicitly noting that penalty is not an instrument under 
consideration because considerations limiting the penalty’s size (such as proportionality) cannot be 
modeled), or optimal randomness, see Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax Administration, at 1450-51 (discussing 
several models).  No widely accepted models of interaction between nominal sanctions and their costs have 
emerged, forcing scholars to simply assume that nominal penalties are subject to an exogenous ceiling, see 
id., at 1450.   This is unfortunate because, as Louis Kaplow observed, “[t]he optimal fine will be a function 
of other instruments under study, and the entire character of the optimum with regard to other instruments 
(here, probability of detection) may differ when the fine is set optimally rather than stipulated.”  Kaplow, 
Fines for Undesirable Acts, at 9. 
73
 This is a bit of an overstatement, see, e.g., Wojciech Kopczuk, Redistribution when Avoidance Behavior 
is Heterogeneous, 81 J. Pub. Econ. 51 (2001) (discussing the circumstances when some evasion would be 
desirable). 
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literature74 is absent from the economic models of tax evasion.  Because any tax evasion is 
undesirable, it is impossible to have too little of it.75 
But why is tax evasion undesirable from the economic perspective?  In other words, what 
is its external harm?  The first answer that comes to mind—that the external harm of evasion is 
the amount of tax evaded—is mistaken.  To see why, consider another critical difference between 
pollution and evasion.  Pollution harms the environment and makes people sick, it reduces 
welfare of the society as a whole.  The same is not true of evasion.  If evasion succeeds, the 
evader benefits from extra wealth.  If evasion is detected and the evader is forced to pay the tax, 
someone else benefits from the same funds.  The effect of collecting (or failing to collect) the 
revenue in question is, therefore, redistributive.76  On the other hand, government’s efforts to 
combat evasion come with real costs that are borne by the government, the evaders, and even by 
the innocent taxpayers.77  Thus, the two distinctions between evasion and pollution point in the 
opposite directions.  Because evasion does not come attached to a valuable activity that we would 
like to encourage at some level, it seems that we should strive to eliminate it completely.  But 
because evasion does not produce, it seems, any external harm, yet is costly to counter, it is 
unclear what is the efficiency-based reason to worry about tax evasion at all.78 
One answer to this question was suggested by Louis Kaplow.  Tax evasion, he argued, 
upsets the distribution of tax burdens (and, more generally, wealth) in the society.79  Assuming 
this distribution is optimal without evasion, deviating from it gives rise to an “equity effect.”80  
The value of the social welfare function (which necessarily contains distributive preferences) in 
the presence of evasion is lower than without it because, by definition, this function is maximized 
if no evasion takes place.  The difference between the two values is the welfare cost of evasion.   
The analysis doesn’t end here, however.  Taxpayers will respond to evasion opportunities 
by changing their behavior, for example by working less, saving more, or moving to industries 
where evading is easier (such as cash-based businesses).  When the economy fully reflects these 
responses (i.e., reaches a long-run equilibrium), the equity effect will be replaced by the 
“efficiency effect.”81  In addition, as long as some taxpayers with evasion opportunities remain 
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 See, e.g., Craswell, The Multiplier Principle, at 2195 (discussing how case-by-case multipliers would 
counter a tendency to overdeter); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 886 (pointing out that if damages are 
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 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax Administration, at 1451; Slemrod, Corporate Selfishness, at 894. 
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Tax, 49 Nat’l Tax J. 135, 135 (1996). 
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 Id., at 139. 
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 Id., at 142. 
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honest while others evade, the honest taxpayers will be treated inequitably because their after-tax 
income would be lower than socially optimal.  Thus, the welfare cost of evasion is likely to have 
both an equity and efficiency components.82 
If we posit that the welfare cost of evasion is its external harm, we can use the analysis 
developed by the general deterrence literature to optimize expected penalties for tax evasion.  But 
this forces us to consider whether the problems with the multiplier principle identified by this 
literature are likely to exist in the tax context.  Unfortunately, they are.  More egregious evasion 
(for example, evading tax on entire income rather than only on its portion) would produce larger 
external harm and also is more likely to be noticed, prosecuted, and punished.83  Likelihood of 
mistaken conviction (or exoneration) may also relate to the size of evasion.  A fraudulent but 
small understatement of income is more likely to be attributed to a taxpayer’s mistake than a large 
one.84  Thus, the general deterrence analysis fully applies in the tax enforcement context and it 
suggests that only case-by-case multipliers would produce optimal tax deterrence. 
 Moreover, even the case-by-case multipliers are unlikely to help in optimizing tax 
enforcement as a practical matter.  The task of calculating the external harm of evasion is 
daunting.85  The calculation is based on the shape of the social welfare function—a notoriously 
controversial issue that involves fundamental questions of distributive justice.  It is difficult and 
contentious enough to put values on a person’s health or the harm to the environment.  One can 
only imagine the outcry if the government attempts to determine expected penalties for tax 
noncompliance based on its calculations derived from a (any!) social welfare function.  Besides, 
we have no choice but to value personal injury and environmental damages when the victims seek 
compensation in courts.  Proponents of the economic analysis of deterrence may apply multipliers 
to these exogenously determined values, as they do, for example, whey they rationalize punitive 
damages.86  Scholars thinking about optimal tax enforcement do not have the same luxury—
welfare cost of tax noncompliance continues to be only a theoretical concept. 
The general deterrence literature suggest that if absolute perfection is out of reach, 
striving for optimal marginal deterrence would be an efficiency-enhancing strategy.  In order to 
pursue it in tax context, we need to consider the various forms of evasion and avoidance.  This 
analysis has been almost entirely absent from the tax compliance literature.87  The omission is due 
in part to the subject that economists chose to study, and in part to the level of generality at which 
they chose to study it. 
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 See, e.g., Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Anatomy of Tax Evasion, 5 J. Law. Econ. Org. 1, 4-5 
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 See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 869. 
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 The rare exceptions are Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, Multiple Modes of Tax Evasion: Theory 
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Economic analysis of tax enforcement has been concerned almost exclusively with tax 
evasion (defined as a clearly illegal intentional non-payment of taxes), as distinguished from tax 
avoidance (defined as a clearly legal reduction of one’s tax liability).88  Thus, to an economist, 
failing to report cash income is evasion; borrowing under a home equity line of credit rather than 
from a credit card company is avoidance.89  Economic literature acknowledges the existence of a 
gray area in the middle, but relegates it to almost an afterthought.90 
This delineation may be fruitful as a first approximation for developing and testing 
economic models, but it is of little help to those interested in studying how taxpayers choose 
among a multitude of alternative tax-motivated arrangements none of which is clearly legal or 
illegal.  Because the proposed penalty primarily aims at affecting precisely this choice, I will refer 
to the transactions falling into this intermediate category as tax avoidance, as distinguished from 
tax evasion (clearly illegal actions due to deliberate cheating) and tax planning (clearly 
permissible tax reduction strategies).  So defined, tax avoidance refers to any transaction or 
position whose tax treatment is uncertain. 
 Economic models neither aim at, nor are capable of, differentiating among various types 
of tax noncompliance, or even different forms of evasion.  They implicitly treat all evasion 
strategies as having the same “price” and available in an unlimited amount.91  These assumptions 
are largely justified as long as only evasion is considered.  Because of the evasion’s very nature, 
one does not need to develop elaborate strategies, engage in sophisticated legal analysis, pay tax 
shelter promoters, and carry out costly and economically unnecessary transactions hoping to 
bolster the dubious schemes used to evade tax.  The most common evasion strategy is simple, 
well-known, and equally available to taxpayers large and small: one simply falsifies the income 
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numbers on the return (at least as long as income is not subject to an information reporting 
regime).92 
The story is markedly different when we turn to avoidance.  Unlike evasion, avoidance is 
often based on overstating any of the deductions, credits, and losses so omnipresent in the 
Internal Revenue Code.  A choice among these subtraction items necessarily gives taxpayers 
more freedom to vary their avoidance strategies, and various strategies bring with them various 
costs.  For example, a taxpayer may expend considerable resources trying to embellish the 
avoidance transaction, hoping to make it look “better” (more plausible, less aggressive) to an 
auditor or a judge.93  Or taxpayer may obtain a legal opinion supporting the transaction, making it 
more difficult for the government to assess penalties.  A taxpayer may also try to conceal the 
aggressive position, making it more difficult (costly) for the government to detect it. 
Overall, some forms of avoidance are more aggressive than others, some are easier to 
conceal than others, some are more expensive to implement than others.  All of these variations 
mean that once a taxpayer decides to engage in tax avoidance, she would have a variety of 
strategies at her disposal.  These strategies would have different, perhaps markedly different, 
“prices” (i.e., private costs), and they would be available in different amounts.  Because tax 
enforcement models deal exclusively with evasion, they ignore these variations completely.  They 
posit taxpayers facing a simple choice: to evade or not to evade.  This binary decision does not 
call for marginal analysis.94  A similar inquiry applied in avoidance context (i.e., to avoid or not 
to avoid) is a grossly inadequate reflection of reality.  The choice faced by taxpayers who decide 
to engage in tax avoidance is much more complex.  In fact, for most taxpayers the question 
whether or not to avoid may be decidedly secondary.  The important decisions are how to avoid 
(i.e., which particular transactions to use) and to what extent (i.e., how aggressive one should be).  
The tax evasion models are simply not designed to analyze these marginal decisions.  Thus, they 
provide no insights into how to optimize taxpayers’ choices of various evasion and, in particular, 
avoidance strategies.  That is, no existing model aims at, let alone succeeds in, optimizing 
marginal deterrence. 
What are the practical implications of this theoretical analysis?  While tax evasion 
models are largely indeterminate, they consistently demonstrate that nominal penalties and 
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probability of punishment play an important role in shaping taxpayers’ behavior.  Empirical 
studies confirm these conclusions, even if to a somewhat uncertain extent.95  Finally, as discussed 
below, Congress and the IRS have varied both the nominal sanctions and the likelihood of their 
imposition in an effort to improve tax administration,96 and there are plenty of statements by the 
representatives of both branches confirming that the attention to these factors has been by no 
means accidental.97  In light of the theoretical support, empirical evidence, and the statutory and 
regulatory measures focused on the two components of Becker’s formula, it is worth taking a 
closer look at whether the existing tax enforcement regime reflects the core insights of the 
economic theory. 
In undertaking this inquiry, we should remember that optimal expected penalties for tax 
noncompliance are at best an abstract concept.  Necessarily, the task of setting optimal nominal 
penalties remains for another day.  Optimizing marginal deterrence is an attractive second-best 
objective, but the theoretical framework needed to reach it is largely absent.  Thus, in analyzing 
the deterrence effects of the existing regime, and in considering the merits of any alternatives, the 
best we can do is to strive for a third-best solution of improving (rather than optimizing) marginal 
deterrence.  Therefore, the following inquiry into the structure of the current statutory sanctions is 
modest in scope: it considers whether the current regime creates incentives that are clearly 
undesirable based on the economic analysis of deterrence.  The point, therefore, is not to test 
whether our tax enforcement system is perfect, but to ensure that it has no obvious flaws. 
III. A Critical Flaw of the Existing Penalties Regime 
1. Nominal Penalties: When They Change and When They Don’t 
In dealing with penalties, the Internal Revenue Code certainly lives up to its reputation.  
The penalty provisions are numerous, technical, and scattered throughout the voluminous statute.  
However, once one finds a path through the maze, it turns out that most civil tax penalties for 
avoidance and evasion are calculated in one of two ways: either as a fixed dollar amount or as a 
fixed percentage of the underpaid tax liability.98  Penalties of both types change based on two 
variables: aggressiveness of a particular avoidance transaction and its absolute size. 
The magnitude of nominal penalties set as a fixed dollar amount frequently depends on 
the seriousness of a violation, with more significant offenses resulting in higher nominal 
penalties.  For example, a failure to furnish information about a so-called reportable transaction is 
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 Other types of penalties apply in specific circumstances, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 32(k) (earned income tax 
credit disallowed for 10 years following a fraudulent claiming of the credit); I.R.C. § 6707A (taxpayer must 
disclose a tax penalty in its financial reports). 
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penalized less severely ($50,000 per violation) than a similar violation with respect to a so-called 
listed transaction ($200,000 or more per violation) on the ground, one presumes, that a listed 
transaction is certain, while a reportable transaction is only likely, to be abusive.99  Similarly, the 
longer the period when an adviser fails to produce a list of potential tax shelter participants, the 
higher is the nominal penalty for the failure.100   
Most civil penalties for avoidance or evasion are calculated as a fixed percentage of  the 
understated or underpaid tax liability rather than as a fixed dollar amount.  These penalties, too, 
usually depend on the gravity of the offense.  Thus, a nominal penalty for civil fraud (75 percent) 
is higher than for negligence (20 percent).101  The same is true for underpayments caused by a 
“gross” valuation misstatement (40 percent) compared to a one that is merely “substantial” (20 
percent).102  In each case, a relatively more egregious violation leads to a larger nominal penalty. 
Many fines set as a fixed dollar amount increase with the absolute size of an offense, 
regardless of how egregious it is.  For example, penalties for failure to file correct information 
returns grow with the number of non-compliant returns.103  Penalties calculated as a fixed 
percentage of an underpayment or understatement by definition grow in absolute dollar terms as 
the amount of the underpayment or understatement increases.104  Thus on average, larger 
avoidance transactions are subject to higher nominal penalties in absolute dollar terms. 
The Code also provides for variation in nominal penalties based on the changes in 
probability of punishment, or, more specifically, in one of its principal components.  Probability 
of punishment is a cumulative probability that an offense will be detected, selected for 
prosecution, that the government will prevail at trial on the substantive issue, decide to seek a 
penalty and convince a court to impose it, the judgments favoring the government will survive 
appeals, and, finally, the government will actually collect the penalty from a taxpayer.  
Probability of punishment is a product of individual probabilities for each of these steps. 
For the remainder of this article I will focus on a single component of the probability of 
punishment—probability of detection—for two reasons.  First, as we are about to see, this 
probability has always been very low for most taxpayers.  Quite possibly, probability of detection 
is the smallest among the relevant probabilities and, therefore, has the largest absolute effect on 
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the overall probability of punishment.105  Second, the penalty proposed in this article aims at 
strengthening deterrence by increasing probability of detection where it is currently particularly 
low. 
The Internal Revenue Code’s mechanism for varying nominal penalties depending on the 
differences in probability of detection is an inducement to disclose.106  In certain cases, penalties 
are reduced if taxpayers voluntarily highlight questionable transactions on their returns.  Thus, an 
accuracy-related penalty is waived if a taxpayer adequately discloses the relevant facts and her 
position satisfies a low “reasonable basis” standard.107  In the absence of disclosure, the taxpayer 
would be liable for penalties unless the disputed position met a higher “substantial authority” 
threshold.108  Similarly, a new penalty for engaging in a reportable transaction is 20 percent if the 
transaction is disclosed and 30 percent if it is not.109 
Variation of nominal penalties for disclosed and undisclosed transactions is relatively 
modest.  On the other hand, probability of detection increases dramatically with disclosure.  If the 
taxpayer highlights the transaction for the IRS, virtually all remaining uncertainty about the future 
tax payment is due to a possibility that the government may or may not agree with the intended 
treatment.  Without disclosure the taxpayer primarily is playing the audit lottery and facing 
exceedingly favorable odds.110  Therefore, most taxpayers are likely to choose not to disclose and 
face a low risk of paying 120 percent or so of a given tax liability plus interest rather than 
disclose and  take a much higher risk of paying 100 percent of the same liability.111  Furthermore, 
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on average.  Yet, the rates are very low for some of the least compliant types of taxpayers, see id., at 1073 
(reporting that audit rate for small businesses declined from 0.58% in 2003 to 0.32% in 2004).  Besides, 
audit rates for virtually all categories have been declining for some time, see id., at 1072 (showing declines 
in audit rates for all categories of individual and corporate taxpayers between 1996 and 2004, with a slight 
rebound for some categories during 2001-2004). 
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 Seasoned practitioners agree.  Considering the likely effects of a 20% increase in penalty for a tax 
shelter-related understatement if the position was not disclosed on a return, Michael Schler noted: “if a 
taxpayer would engage in a transaction without disclosure in the face of a potential 20% penalty, the 
taxpayer is hardly likely to disclose because of the risk of a 40% penalty.”  Michael L. Schler, Ten More 
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because the probability of having to pay tax if a transaction is revealed is higher for more 
aggressive transactions while the likelihood that a transaction would be eventually detected is not 
necessarily dependent of its aggressiveness, taxpayers have stronger incentives not to disclose 
more dubious schemes.  In sum, the existing inducement to disclose is unlikely to work in many 
cases, and it is less likely to work where it would be needed most. 
As a result, the structure of nominal penalties in the Internal Revenue Code has a 
potentially serious weakness.  Nominal penalties are higher for more aggressive arrangements 
and for those that reduce tax liability by a larger amount.  However, other than varying penalties 
depending on whether a transaction is disclosed (a variation that is unlikely to be of great 
significance for the reasons just described), nominal penalties are independent of, and unaffected 
by, probability of detection.  This would not be particularly troubling if probability of detection 
remained fairly constant from one strategy to the next.  However, there is every reason to think 
that it differs widely among different taxpayers and strategies, producing variations in expected 
penalties that are not only significant, but also unintended and undesirable from the marginal 
deterrence perspective. 
2. Deliberate Variations in  Probability of Detection  
In tax enforcement context, probability of detection has two main components: audit rate 
and audit effectiveness.  The former is the likelihood that a return will be examined by an IRS 
agent.  The latter is the odds that the auditor will find avoidance during the examination.  
Changes in both of components affect the overall probability. 
Starting with audit rates, it is well-known that IRS examinations are not conducted at 
random.  Based on the information gathered through the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program (“TCMP”) that ran for almost three decades and is regarded as the best source of 
information about tax noncompliance,112 the IRS developed formulas for selecting returns that are 
more likely to contain questionable items.113  Furthermore, the IRS has been traditionally focused 
on the magnitude of potential audit adjustments.114 As a result, audit rates are higher for 
corporations than for individuals, and for larger corporations compared to the smaller ones.115  
Similarly, returns of higher income individuals are examined more frequently than of those with 
                                                                                                                                                              
Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 Tax L. 
Rev. 325, 363 (2002). 
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 See Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer 
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 See, e.g., Brown & Mazur, supra note 112, at 1262.  As a result of this program, the percentage of 
examinations resulting in no adjustments dropped from 50 percent to 20 percent at one point, see id.  
However, this percentage has been on the rise because the government’s data became outdated, see id., at 
1263.  A new program has been put in place in 2001 and the data has just started to arrive, see Kenney, 
supra note 12, at 7. 
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 See, e.g., Brown & Mazur, supra note 112, at 1267 n.35; Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. 
Wilde, The Changing Face of Tax Enforcement, 43 Tax Law. 893, 903 (1989) (noting that “the audit 
process is designed to select first returns with the highest potential yield”). 
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 See Kenney, supra note 110, at 1071. 
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lower incomes,116 taxpayers with business or farm income face higher chances of an audit than 
those without it,117 and the unfortunate souls whose returns trigger the audit selection formulas 
are examined more often than those who manage to file inconspicuous returns.  The differences 
are dramatic.  At one extreme, the largest companies undergo a continuous audit.  At another, 
individual taxpayers who earn primarily wage income and take standard deductions face an audit 
rate in the neighborhood of one half of one percent. 
In contrast with audit rates that are well-known and well-documented, audit effectiveness 
is much harder to estimate because the inquiry involves a counterfactual.  To gauge audit 
effectiveness, we would need to compare the number of questionable transactions actually 
identified during tax audits with the number of these transactions that would have been identified 
had auditors been able to spot all of them.  They can’t and there lies the problem.  Of course, 
there is a perfect source of information on the issue—the taxpayers themselves.  For obvious 
reasons, data collected from this source is not particularly reliable, no matter how hard the 
researches work to convince the taxpayers who participate in the surveys that their revelations 
will remain confidential.118  The existing estimates of audit effectiveness suggest that somewhere 
between one half and two thirds of noncompliance remained undetected during the unusually 
thorough TCMP audits.119  This likely means that the rate of detection during typical audits is 
below (perhaps well below) 50 percent. 
Nonetheless, it is quite clear that audit effectiveness (and probability of detection in 
general) is higher for transactions of a particular type—those subject to mandatory disclosure 
regimes.  The so-called Schedule M-1 is a case in point.  For more than four decades, large and 
mid-size corporate taxpayers have been required to attach to their tax returns a special form 
where they reconciled their financial and tax accounting figures, Schedule M-1.120  The 
government recognized that the two accounting systems create the opposite incentives: taxpayers 
would prefer to have more income for financial reporting purposes, but less income for tax 
purposes.  While tax and financial accounting rules differ and there is nothing inherently wrong 
when a transaction produces a so-called book-tax difference, there is a higher probability that a 
tax auditor would find aggressive tax positions if she focuses on these transactions.  This is 
because many of the same considerations that point, for example, to treating a given security as 
                                                     
116
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equity (rather than debt) for accounting purposes also suggest that it should be treated as equity 
for tax purposes.  In the end, the proper tax characterization of the security may well be debt.  But 
the question is likely to be close precisely because the security had enough equity-like features to 
swing the accounting treatment the other way.121  A special disclosure requirement forcing 
taxpayers to separately report all book-tax differences raises probability of detection in an area 
that, on average, is more likely to encompass noncompliance.122 
The government’s latest effort to combat proliferation of abusive tax shelters embodies 
the same idea on a grand scale.  The recent tax shelter regulations (“Regulations”) identify the 
most typical features of transactions viewed by the government as tax avoidance and require 
taxpayers to disclose all transactions that possess any of these features (the so-called “reportable 
transactions”).123  In addition to significant book-tax differences, transactions that result in large 
losses, involve brief asset holding periods, are protected by confidentiality agreements, or by 
contingent fee and similar arrangements trigger the disclosure requirements.  Taxpayers must also 
disclose any of the specific transactions designated by the government as, essentially, illegitimate 
tax shelters (the so-called “listed transactions”).124  The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the 
“2004 Act”) expanded the Regulations’ reach even further, and backed them up with new 
penalties, including a dramatic and heretofore unheard of penalty for tax advisors equal to 
$10,000 per each day of a violation.125 
                                                     
121
 For a detailed discussion of one such security, see David Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and 
Debt in the New Financial Environment, 49 Tax L. Rev. 499, 517-519 (1994) (describing the MIPS 
transaction). 
122
 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775, 1780-81 
(1999) (arguing that a modern corporate tax shelter must produce a book-tax difference because executives 
are unwilling to reduce the corporation’s taxes at a cost of diminishing book earnings). 
123
 See T.D. 9046, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,161 (March 3, 2003) (withdrawing several sets of proposed regulations 
and promulgating final regulations under Sections 6011, 6111, and 6112).  Taxpayers must disclose these 
transactions separately from their tax returns and, in addition, file the disclosure forms with the Office of 
Tax Shelter Analysis, see Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a), (e). 
124
 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a), (b)(2).  Technically, listed transactions are just one type of reportable 
transactions.  Because some of the issues raised by listed transactions differ from those raised by all others, 
I will refer to them separately and will use the term “reportable transaction” to describe all other 
transactions subject to the Regulations. 
125
 Under the Act, a failure to disclose a listed transaction or a reportable transaction (as they are defined in 
the Regulations) with a significant tax avoidance purpose is subject to penalties regardless of whether the 
transaction is eventually litigated and upheld by a court, see I.R.C. § 6707A.  Taxpayers who incurred 
penalties under these rules must disclose this fact on statements filed with the SEC, if any, see I.R.C. § 
6707A(e).  A broad range of organizers, promoters, legal advisors, and accountants (the so-called “material 
advisors”) involved in any reportable transaction above a given size must disclose their participation and 
are subject to serious penalties for failure to comply, see I.R.C. § 6111, 6707.  In addition, material advisors 
are required to keep the lists of their clients who participated in any reportable transaction regardless of its 
size, see I.R.C. § 6112, and provide any such lists upon the government’s request or face a draconian 
penalty of $10,000 per day, see I.R.C. § 6708.  Finally, the Act added a new penalty for any understatement 
related to a listed or reportable transaction with a tax avoidance purpose that applies even if participation in 
this transaction made no difference for the taxpayer’s overall tax bill (because, for example, the taxpayer 
owed no tax for the year in any case), see I.R.C. § 6662A.  No doubt, these measures have dramatically 
increased probability of detection for any transaction subject to the Regulations. 
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Just like the Schedule M-1, the Regulations create a class of transactions that will be 
scrutinized in greater detail than the rest of the return.  The reportable transaction categories were 
chosen precisely because they are more likely to encompass dubious arrangements.  Because the 
probability of finding avoidance is higher if an auditor focuses on these transactions, she should 
be expected to do just that.126 
Finally, audit effectiveness is very high when taxpayers themselves highlight their 
questionable positions for the government.  They do so, sometimes, in response to one of several 
government’s programs designed to cajole (rather than force) taxpayers to reveal these positions 
either before or after they file their returns.  Programs in the former category provide certainty in 
exchange for self-identification.127  Post-filing programs such as amnesty and settlement offers 
entice taxpayers to confess about their tax avoidance in exchange for a reduction in (or 
elimination of) penalties.128  The government has recently used both types of offers and has 
expressed satisfaction with the results.129 
Taxpayers who take advantage of any of these programs dramatically change probability 
of detection for any given strategy.  But one would hardly expect them to do so irrationally or 
accidentally.  In case of pre-filing programs, taxpayers who identify themselves most likely 
believe that nominal penalties would not apply in any case.  Settlements and amnesties have little 
effect on taxpayers’ ex ante calculations at the time they decide to undertake avoidance 
strategies.130  In sum, the voluntary disclosure programs are unlikely to change expected penalties 
to a significant extent. 
In contrast, variations in probability of detection due to differing audit rates and 
mandatory disclosure regimes surely produce divergent expected penalties for various types of 
taxpayers and transactions.  A large company under a continuous audit has a chance that an 
aggressive transaction reflected on Schedule M-1 would go unnoticed, but the odds are against 
the taxpayer.131  The expected penalty is relatively close to its nominal value in this case.  On the 
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other hand, a small entrepreneur who takes a questionable deduction not subject to any mandatory 
disclosure regime is unlikely to be audited, the deduction is unlikely to be questioned on audit, 
and the expected penalty is nowhere near its nominal size. 
These variations in the expected penalties, however, are deliberate.  In fact, the very 
reason why the largest companies undergo a continuous audit and why taxpayers are required to 
disclose reportable and listed transactions is that the government is particularly concerned about 
noncompliance of these taxpayers and by use of these transactions.  In case of reportable 
transactions the deterrence objective is especially clear.  The government believes that many 
transactions covered by the Regulations are aggressive, so the higher expected penalties for these 
arrangements are designed to deter taxpayers from using them, or, in other words, to induce 
taxpayers to enter into transactions not subject to the Regulations.132 
Whether the government’s is likely to succeed is less than clear,133 but one can hardly 
doubt that the measures discussed in this section reflect the government’s deliberate efforts to 
vary expected penalties by altering probability of detection (and, in some cases, nominal penalties 
as well).  The same cannot be said about the disparities discussed next. 
3. The Red Flags Strategy and Its (Unintended) Consequences 
Mandatory disclosure rules such as Schedule M-1 and the Regulations are just one reason 
why probability of detection varies from one transaction to the next and from one item on a return 
to another.  It is no secret that while some arrangements are obvious even to a novice auditor, 
other schemes are next to impossible to find on a tax return.  This disparity exists, at least in part, 
because of a strategy used by auditors to detect questionable positions.  To use a common 
metaphor, auditors find tax avoidance by looking for red flags.134  Understanding what these red 
flags are and how they help auditors in detecting tax avoidance is crucial for recognizing the 
serious deficiency of the current tax enforcement regime. 
Let’s start with a few examples.  During the late 1970s IRS auditors noticed something 
strange on returns of urban and suburban doctors, lawyers, and other white-collar professionals.  
A growing number of these taxpayers were claiming large losses from farming, chinchilla 
breeding, movie production, and other activities that seemed unusual and unrelated to their 
lifestyle or typical investment strategies.135  Sure enough, with some investigative work the 
government discovered what came to be known as the tax shelter crisis of the 1970s. 
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Fast forward twenty years.  IRS personnel examining returns of various U.S. companies 
could not understand why more and more of them went into the leasing business (or so it 
seemed). 136  When, alarmed by large lease-related deductions, the agents inquired about the 
underlying transactions, things got even stranger.  Why would a prominent U.S. bank, for 
example, lease a transportation or a sewage system of a quaint town somewhere in Europe and 
immediately lease it back to the municipality?  Puzzled by this inexplicable activity, the auditors 
kept asking questions until they discovered one of the most wide-spread tax avoidance schemes 
of the recent past.  In fact, this arrangement has become so popular that the legislative provision 
eliminating any doubt (if there ever was one) that this scheme fails to deliver the intended tax 
benefits is expected to raise more than $25 billion over the next 10 years according to the 
Congressional budget estimates.137  As with chinchilla breeding, these so-called lease-in, lease-
out deals were spotted because they resulted in deductions that stood out on returns, i.e., raised 
red flags. 
Another recent example suggests that taxpayers hate to raise red flags just as much as the 
auditors like to focus on them.  Managers of a prominent hedge fund entered into a transaction of 
questionable legality that promised to reduce their taxable income by about $100 million.138  
However, they understood that including a $100 million loss on Schedule M-1 would draw 
unwanted attention from the IRS, so they offset the loss against other gains and reported only the 
net number.  The trick didn’t work.  When the court considered whether to allow the loss it was 
particularly annoyed by the taxpayers’ “efforts to keep the huge tax losses claimed from raising a 
red audit flag.”139  In fact, taxpayers’ evasiveness may have contributed to the court’s decision to 
impose penalties.140 
One need not be a super-wealthy hedge fund manager to be aware of the red flags 
technique.  When a group of taxpayers participating in a study agreed to record their daily 
thoughts related to tax return preparation, one of the participants immortalized the following 
wisdom: 
I was satisfied [at first] with the number [of an anticipated refund for 1987], 
but looked at my 1986 tax and found out I took quite a bit higher number on 
charitable contributions [in 1986] so I went back and added more on.  On 
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to thereby potentially win the audit lottery and evade IRS detection.”). 
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certain categories like charitable contributions, it isn’t good to vary too 
greatly from year to year.141 
The intuition behind the focus on red flags is obvious.  The government’s audit selection 
formulas are imperfect.  Once the audit decision is made, the IRS examiners have neither time nor 
resources to understand the taxpayer’s business or personal situation in all of its minute details in 
order to examine each line on the return in the most comprehensive manner.142  Thus, the 
government needs strategies that would help it identify, with speed and consistency, the more 
aggressive returns during audit selection and the areas where avoidance is more likely during 
audits.  It appears highly probable that looking for red flags is one such strategy.143  If so, what 
exactly are these red flags? 
With some exceptions, tax returns are compilations of lines showing “items,” not a series 
of reports describing individual transactions.  These items reflect taxpayer’s income, losses, 
deductions, and credits in a more or less aggregate manner.  The essence of a red flag can be 
gleaned from the above examples.  An item is likely to raise a red flag in one of two cases.  First, 
if only a single-year return is examined, a significant item that has no apparent relation to 
taxpayer’s business or personal circumstances is likely to draw attention.  If the audit involves 
returns for more than one year, a red flag would appear if a given item changes dramatically from 
one year to the next, or if a particular item appears on one and only one return, and there is no 
ready explanation for either pattern.  In sum, the more “unusual” the item is (in a sense just 
described, and as this term will be used in the remainder of the article), the more likely it is to be 
scrutinized on audit.144 
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 John S. Carroll, How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and Values, in WHY PEOPLE PAY 
TAXES 43, 58. Researches have also discovered that taxpayers perceive detection to be more likely if “tax 
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 This is hardly a surprising revelation.  Researches discussing TCMP audits repeatedly contrast their 
thoroughness with a limited inquiry that takes place during regular audits, see, e.g., Brian Erard, The 
Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 95, 98 (comparing “the audits 
[undertaken as part of the TCMP program that] were unusually thorough in that every line item on the 
return was examined” with “ordinary IRS audits [that] typically concern only a small number of issues 
relating to a tax return.”); Rice, supra note 119, at 131 (noting that the “IRS assigns some of its most 
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 Financial accountants, whose job comes closest to tax auditing, are laboring under similar constraints 
and respond with a strategy similar to the red flags approach: 
We know that auditors can’t possibly look at everything . . . .  Thus, practitioners must 
pick and choose where to spend their time.  They must figure out how to generate the 
most “bang for the buck” from their audit efforts.  Naturally, it’s logical to focus on areas 
that contain the most risk—and that’s exactly the intent of a risk-based audit. 
Thomas P. Houck, WHY AND HOW AUDITS MUST CHANGE, at 16 (2003). 
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 I do not suggest that unusual items just described are the only items that raise red flags.  For instance, an 
IRS official mentioned that a sudden very large gift to a tax-exempt organization serves as a red flag 
indicating potential terrorism connections, see Fred Stokeld et al., EO Reps Take It All In at Georgetown 
Conference, 103 Tax Notes 642, 645 (2004).  Not surprisingly, a disclosure by a taxpayer that she has taken 
a position on her tax return that is contrary to a Treasury regulation or an IRS revenue ruling raises a red 
flag for the government and makes an audit likely, see, e.g., George R. Goodman, Tax Return Compliance, 
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Decisions regarding whether an item is “significant,” whether it is sufficiently “related” 
to the taxpayer’s business, whether a change is “dramatic” are imprecise and unlikely to be made 
with a high degree of consistency.  This is not to say, however, that these rough judgments do not 
play a major role in determining how tax audits are conducted.  The government has not been 
eager to admit directly anything that specific.145  Audit strategies such as the audit selection 
formulas are among the IRS’s most closely guarded secrets.146  The government has been 
extremely reluctant to release individual return data collected through TCMP out of concern that 
researches would use it to reverse-engineer audit patterns.147  In a rather odd example, the IRS 
provided a small group of scholars with a detailed data on corporate noncompliance only to 
withdraw the access shortly thereafter.148  In light of this extreme secrecy, one should hardly 
expect clear statements in support of the red flags hypothesis from the IRS. 
Evidence of taxpayers’ and courts’ beliefs that the red flags approach is widely used 
during audits is admittedly sparse.  However, it clearly exists, as the examples just described, as 
well as other precedents, demonstrate.149  Scholars have asserted, in one form or the other, that a 
chance of detecting noncompliance depends on the relationship between the size of an illegally 
claimed item and the amount of the legitimate item of the same type on the return.150  Economists 
                                                                                                                                                              
76 Tax Notes 1201, 1210 (1997).  An astute commentator suggested that “[t]he technical term for a return 
with large income items and obvious offsetting deductions is red flag,” Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: 
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formulas, [the government] again curtailed much of this access.”). 
149
 See, e.g., United States v. Neill, 964 F. Supp. 438, 452 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (referring to accountant’s 
fears that transfers to an offshore account would raise a “red flag” for the IRS); United States v. Fawaz, 881 
F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that certain deductions may raise “a red flag inducing the IRS to 
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[taxpayer’s] tax return.”); Ketchum v. Comm’r, 697 F.2d 466, 473 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that certain 
deductions “were not simply disclosed in the returns; they were disclosed with a red flag flying”). 
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 For example, Joel Slemrod suggests that shifting income by a corporate parent to a subsidiary in a low-
tax country is more likely to go unnoticed if the parent already has a subsidiary generating a significant 
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model tax evasion based on an “intuitively appealing idea that, ceteris paribus, both the absolute 
amount and the proportion of income concealed may matter” in detecting noncompliance.151  
Some models expressly postulate that a relative size of noncompliance (i.e., the amount of 
incorrectly reported item compared to its true amount) affects the likelihood that a particular line 
on the return would be examined.152  Researches note that the auditors look for unusual, 
“suspicious looking” items153 that appear to be “outliers.”154  Even The New York Times informs 
its readers that auditors typically search for “red flags, like spikes in income.”155  There is a small 
but promising empirical literature showing that taxpayers manage the risk of detection by 
choosing which line items to misreport.156  Helping taxpayers to avoid red flags is part of what 
some tax advisors believe to be “the highest ethical standards.”157  Red flags even became part the 
tax folklore.158 
A recent development further boosts the hypothesis.  Because auditors decide where to 
focus their efforts based on items rather than transactions, the level of tax return’s specificity is 
critically important to the success of the red flags strategy.  At an extreme, if a tax return 
                                                                                                                                                              
income in that country, see Slemrod, Corporate Selfishness, at 894.  Presumably, this is because a slight 
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contained one aggregate line item showing a taxpayer’s income or loss for the year, there would 
be no way to distinguish usual from unusual.  The more detailed are the items required to be 
shown on a return (within limits), the better the strategy works.  While increasing the number of 
items subject to separate reporting forces auditors to process more information, the benefits of the 
additional disclosure are likely to outweigh the costs because an auditor would not study each 
additional item with equal care.  Rather, she would check for red flags and focus only on those 
items that raise suspicions.159 
The comprehensive revision of Schedule M-1 undertaken by the IRS in 2004 followed 
precisely this strategy.  The old form was helpful, but not detailed enough.160  The new Schedule 
M-3 asks the same basic question: what are the differences in taxpayer’s tax and financial 
accounting?  However, the level of specificity with which taxpayers must answer the question has 
risen substantially.  Whereas the old Schedule M-1 had identified only eight book-tax differences, 
the new Schedule M-3 highlights sixty seven!161  This is a great improvement for auditors relying 
on the red flags approach.  As importantly, government’s justifications for the new schedule are 
entirely consistent with this hypothesis.  Additional disclosure, the officials have explained, is 
expected to help the government to “increase transparency”162 and identify “aggressive 
transactions.”163  It will become an “examination tool”164 that would enable the IRS to “set 
priorities for use of its resources”165  by “distinguish[ing] between high-risk and low-risk 
returns.”166  Moreover, in a somewhat unusual display of openness, a high-ranking Treasury 
official made no secret of the fact that the government plans to use Schedule M-3 as an audit 
selection tool.167  In fact, the government is so convinced that a more detailed disclosure would 
improve its ability to detect noncompliance that it is planning to revise other forms along the 
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 Taxpayers’ costs of disaggregating various items should not be high as long as the more detailed 
disclosure covers sub-items that would have to be computed in any case on the way to calculating the 
aggregate numbers. 
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same lines.168  These plans are entirely consistent with the assumption that the IRS relies on red 
flags during audits. 
Finally, if one plunges into the depths of the voluminous materials prepared by the IRS 
for its field agents and made available to the general public under the Freedom of Information 
Act,169 one finds remarkably revealing evidence of the red flags approach.  The agency instructs 
its agents to analyze returns before contacting taxpayers in order to identify “large, unusual, or 
questionable items.”170  The government even has an acronym for these items—LUQ—that, I 
suspect, is pronounced “lucky”!  And what are these LUQ items?  They are remarkably similar to 
the ones I have termed “unusual.”171  In light of this evidence, the only reason to stop short of 
declaring that the red flags approach is one of the government’s main (if not the main) audit 
strategies is that, in addition to focusing on LUQ items, auditors are instructed to follow multiple 
other directives as well. 
In sum, red flags carry a double-duty in increasing probability of detection for 
transactions that raise them.  First, the government is more likely to audit a return that has a red 
flag.  Second, once the return is audited, the unusual item is more likely to be examined with 
particular care compared to other items on the return.  Thus, there is every reason to believe that 
the likelihood of detection for items that raise red flags is significantly higher than for those that 
do not. 
We can now summarize the current state of tax enforcement.  The existing system 
combines widely diverging probabilities of detection with largely constant nominal penalties.  
First, probabilities of detection vary based on audit selection strategies.  Second, for those returns 
that are selected for examination, likelihood of detection is higher if a transaction falls within a 
category that requires mandatory disclosure or if it is unusual and raises a red flag.  In contrast, 
while nominal penalties depend on the size and aggressiveness of an avoidance scheme, they vary 
fairly little among different tax planning techniques.  As a result, expected penalties differ 
substantially from one strategy to the next. 
Some of these variations are intentional.  Differences in expected penalties resulting from 
the mandatory disclosure rules and audit selection formulas reflect the government’s efforts to 
increase deterrence in a particularly problematic area or, perhaps, to raise most revenue given the 
limited funds available for enforcement.  Not surprisingly, the government does not attempt to 
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 See Michael I. Saltzman, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶  3.01. 
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 Int. Rev. Man. ¶ 4.10.2.3. 
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conceal the existence of these differences.  To the contrary, the IRS makes the information public 
being fully aware that taxpayers would take it into account. 
In contrast, variations in probability of detection caused by the red flags approach are a 
product of necessity.  While this strategy may assist the government in finding some tax 
avoidance, it produces variations in expected penalties that are anything but desirable from the 
deterrence perspective.  Perhaps, the government recognizes the problem and, therefore, is 
unwilling to publicize the use of this strategy.  This secrecy changes little.  The decisions by the 
hedge fund managers and the taxpayer in the survey described above were almost certainly 
motivated by their assumptions that the IRS would be looking for red flags.  If federal courts, tax 
commentators, and (occasionally) even government officials refer to this strategy as a common 
knowledge, the proverbial cat is probably out of the bag.172 
The economic theory of deterrence suggests that taxpayers would structure their 
avoidance transactions to produce the lowest expected penalties.173  Among other things, this 
means that taxpayers are likely to expend considerable efforts in order to avoid raising red flags.  
If so, what was identified earlier as a potential weakness in the existing penalties structure is in 
fact a critical flaw.  Because most taxpayers are likely to face the lowest expected penalties, the 
overall deterrence is only as strong as these penalties provide.  Thus, it matters little that for some 
tax avoidance transactions expected penalties are fairly high because taxpayers would tend to 
forego these transactions.  Rather, it is critically important that for other avoidance strategies 
expected penalties are exceedingly low because these are likely to be the strategies used by most 
taxpayers.174 
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More specifically, while some taxpayers may engage in avoidance or evasion that is 
likely to trigger an audit and would be obvious once the return is examined, we should expect that 
many more taxpayers would act differently.  They would look for avoidance opportunities with 
the lowest expected penalties, and, faced with the same nominal penalties for all opportunities 
(assuming equal aggressiveness and size), they would search for the strategies with the lowest 
probability of detection.175  In plain English, they would try to hide their aggressive transactions.  
Inevitably, even if unintentionally, the current enforcement regime ensures that probability of 
detection for transactions that do not raise red flags is particularly low.  This encourages 
taxpayers to conceal their avoidance, producing social waste while failing to collect revenue.  
Economic analysis suggest that reducing variation in expected penalties for transactions that we 
would like to deter equally would reduce the existing inefficient incentives and improve overall 
deterrence. 
IV. Eliminating the Flaw, Improving Deterrence 
1. More of the Same? 
If this analysis is correct, how can the government respond?  A look at Becker’s formula 
suggests several alternatives.  First, the government can raise the probability of detection for all 
transactions, including the “usual” ones (i.e., those transactions that do not raise red flags) by 
increasing audit rates across the board.  Yet, this would hardly solve the problem because even 
though an overall likelihood of detecting noncompliance would increase, the taxpayers’ incentive 
to conceal would remain unaffected.  As long as auditors use the red flags approach, it would pay 
to hide avoidance no matter how high (or low) the audit rates are.  Raising generally-applicable 
nominal penalties (such as those for negligence or disregard of rules and regulations) would be 
similarly ineffective. 
Increasing probability of detection by raising audit effectiveness holds more promise.  
This strategy could go a long way toward resolving the problem because, ideally, it would make 
the red flags technique unnecessary.  If IRS agents have time and expertise to examine each 
return item as carefully as needed, they would not need shortcuts such as the red flags strategy.  
Unfortunately, dramatic improvements in audit effectiveness are unlikely.  Government’s prior 
limited attempts to conduct more thorough examinations highlight the potential perils clearly 
enough.  A relatively small number of comprehensive audits designed to provide the IRS with 
critical tax compliance information caused enough outrage to shut down the program for over a 
decade.176  It has been recently renewed, and the IRS has promptly come under attack from 
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e.g., Amy Hamilton, The Tax Gap Game and Inklings of a Focus on Noncompliance, 79 Tax Notes 933, 
935 (1998) (referring to “incessant congressional criticism frequently describing TCMP as ‘audits from 
hell’” as playing a role in discontinuance of the program). 
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Congressmen eager to protect their constituencies.177  The IRS’s attempt to collect detailed 
taxpayer information in order to improve the administration of the earned income tax credit 
program has resulted in a law suit against the agency and plenty of scathing rhetoric from Capitol 
Hill.178  By any measure, political costs of raising audit effectiveness will not be small.  
Administrative costs of a meaningful increase may be even higher.  Hiring and training more 
examiners and extending audits will come at a steep price.  In fact, current audit costs are so 
significant and the budgetary constraints are so great that one of the IRS’s latest objectives is to 
reduce the time spent on each audit. 
In sum, resource constraints, political pressures, and the general fiscal difficulties that are 
likely to persist well into the future make raising probability of detection in a meaningful way 
somewhat unrealistic.  Perhaps, if no other measure could be devised to resolve the problem, the 
government would need to incur these costs and improve audit effectiveness.  Before concluding 
that this is the only viable alternative, however, we should consider whether reforming nominal 
penalties other than by simply raising them across the board may offer a more cost-effective 
solution. 
2. New, But Not Necessarily Improved 
Ideally, we would like to counter taxpayers’ attempts to hide avoidance by raising 
nominal penalties for those transactions that are harder to detect.  Why not do this directly?  Thus, 
if the IRS detects a dubious transaction during an audit and prevails in court, it could levy a 
penalty whose amount would depend on how difficult it was for the government to find this 
transaction in the first place.  For example, if one strategy was twice as hard to catch as an 
average avoidance scheme, the penalty would be 200 percent of that imposed under the current 
rules.  This approach would amount to the use of case-by-case multipliers analyzed in detail in 
the general deterrence literature.179  Once taxpayers become aware of this regime, they would 
realize that it doesn’t pay to conceal their tax avoidance. 
Unfortunately, the difficulties and dangers of this proposal are both numerous and 
significant.  To begin with, the penalty may be so high in a given case that a court would 
characterize it as a criminal rather than civil sanction.180  If it does, the penalty may be 
unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto clause.  Furthermore, retroactive penalties raise Due 
Process concerns.  Courts have been quite deferential when Congress applied higher penalties to 
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transactions that took place before these penalties were enacted.181  However, the opinions dealt 
with fairly unusual transitional situations reflecting changes from one fixed penalty regime to 
another.182  One should hardly presume that judges would be equally willing to endorse a system 
where most of the penalties are set within a complete discretion of the enforcement agency as a 
matter of course.  Finally, a broad use of ex post penalties would fly in the face of a long standing 
legislative practice against retroactive application of new tax laws, even when these laws are 
aimed at shutting down abusive tax shelters.183 
Doctrinal and historic considerations do not nearly exhaust the list of concerns raised by 
the proposal.  It would be hard to verify the government’s claims regarding the difficulty of 
identifying a given arrangement because no one but the government is engaged in tax audits and 
can serve to support or challenge the government’s assertions.  At the same time, given the 
widespread belief that the current level of enforcement is grossly insufficient, there is a danger 
that the government would ask for higher penalties for those who are caught to compensate for 
many cases where, it believes, it failed to identify noncompliance.  Furthermore, it would be very 
difficult to determine with any kind of precision how much higher a penalty in a given case 
should be compared to the base line case.  How would an auditor decide (and the court evaluate) 
whether it was three times or four times as hard to spot a particular scheme as compared to some 
average reference strategy?  Note that the difference between these two multipliers amounts to 
100 percent of the current sanction.  It is also unclear how the base line strategy for which no 
extra penalties are levied should be set.  Should it depend on the type of a taxpayer and the skill 
level of an auditor?184  How arbitrary would this penalty become if the answers to these questions 
are “no”? 
Because the stakes will be high and the uncertainty great, the amount of litigation along 
the lines just described is likely to dwarf the number of controversies related to the substantive 
tax issues.185  Additional costs for the taxpayers and the government would be enormous.  Finally, 
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 See, e.g., Licari v. Comm’r, 946 F.2d 690, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that retroactive tax penalties 
must be upheld as long as they are “supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational 
means” and that the purposes behind retroactive tax penalties are “to guard the public fisc by reimbursing 
the government for heavy burden of investigative and prosecutorial costs incident to ferreting out tax 
underpayment” and to “benefit[ ] the public revenue.”).  In addition to the Due Process challenges, 
taxpayers made even less successful Equal Protection arguments, see, e.g., id. at 693 (addressing both the 
Equal Protection and Due Process arguments and noting that the latter presents a “thornier issue”). 
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 Courts repeatedly assert that retroactive application of tax law is unobjectionable as long as the period of 
retroactivity is short, see, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1994) (a period of “only 
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I.R.C. 7805(b)(3) (the Secretary of the Treasury may issue retroactive regulations only to prevent abuse). 
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 Research based on TCMP audits suggests that there is a substantial variation in detection rates across 
IRS examiners, see Andreoni et al., supra note 33, at 850.  Another question would be whether the penalty 
should be reduced for naïve taxpayers whose tax avoidance was more obvious than average. 
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 Today, taxpayers vigorously argue against imposition of penalties equal to a small portion of the tax 
liability, see, e.g., Susan Simmonds, Penalties on Appeal in LTCM Shelter Litigation, 106 Tax Notes 925, 
925 (2005) (describing taxpayer’s appeal of $16 million in penalties, but not of the underlying $106 million 
tax liability).  One can easily imagine the response if a penalty exceeds 100 percent of the tax liability, or 
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an ability to drastically increase the penalty based on obscure considerations would give auditors 
enormous power in their negotiations with taxpayers regarding all other disputed items on their 
returns—a power that in some cases is likely to be abused.  “Thousands of years of history with 
corrupt tax collectors”186 provide a strong incentive to search for less uncertain measures. 
These problems are hardly surprising.  The suggested approach would give so much 
discretion to the tax enforcement agency that on a rules-standards continuum it would go off the 
chart, nearing “untrammeled discretion.”187  Yet an economic analysis of the rules/standards 
choice suggests that the penalty for hiding tax noncompliance should be more rule-like. 
This analysis is based on comparing the costs incurred when legal commands are 
promulgated, learned, and enforced.188  The key variable is frequency.  Generally, rules (i.e., ex 
ante determinations of the law’s content) are costlier than standards (ex post determinations) to 
promulgate, but are cheaper to learn and enforce.189  Thus, if a given command is applied 
frequently (by the agents it governs as they learn it and by the enforcers who apply the 
command), it would be cost-effective to promulgate this command as a rule.  If, however, the 
command will be used only rarely, a standard would be more efficient.  The distinction between 
rules and standards is reduced, although not eliminated, if application of a standard quickly leads 
to creation of a rule-like precedent.190 
If enacted, the penalty addressed here will be relevant for every taxpayer with respect to 
each item whose treatment is at all uncertain.  The IRS would be free to assert the penalty at will, 
so courts are likely to face it on many occasions.  Large costs of learning and applying a vague 
standard in this context suggest that a rule would be preferable.  This suggestion is reinforced by 
the fact that the development of a precedent is unlikely.  If the IRS sets the penalty based on its 
internal evaluations, any justifications for imposing a particular penalty would be shielded from a 
court, and no rules useful for future controversies will develop. 
Nevertheless, the case for a rule-based regime is not unequivocal.  While hiding 
aggressive schemes is no doubt common, the economic analysis views violations as frequent only 
if their specific features are similar enough to merit identical treatment.191  Thus, it would be 
efficient to counter attempts to conceal tax avoidance with a rule only if the key features of many 
                                                                                                                                                              
becomes an even higher multiple of the unpaid tax.  This point is well-understood in the general deterrence 
literature, see, e.g., Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers, at 469. 
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 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 251. 
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 Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L.R. 953, 960 (1995). 
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 The following discussion is based on Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
Duke L.J. 557 (1992).  
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 See id., at 562.  While Kaplow frequently substitutes the cost of legal advice for the cost of learning in 
general (whether by acquiring advice, studying the rules, or purchasing software that would apply these 
rules for the purchaser), it is clear that he uses the latter only as a typical example of the former, see id., at 
564. 
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 See id., at 577. 
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 See id., at 600.  For example, although auto-accidents are frequent and are similar in that they involve 
injuries sustained from human contact with motorized vehicles, each accident has so many idiosyncratic 
features that trying to account for all of them in a rule would be wasteful because any particular accident is 
highly unlikely to arise. 
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concealment strategies are identical (or at least very similar).  The challenge, then, is to devise a 
more rule-like penalty that would be sufficiently general to cover a variety of concealment 
techniques, yet specific enough for the future savings to exceed the costs incurred in 
promulgating the penalty.  A number of approaches appear promising.  The government’s 
discretion may be constrained.  For instance, it may be allowed to take only certain factors into 
account in deciding how difficult it was to discover a particular avoidance or evasion transaction.  
The IRS may be required to justify the size of the penalty to a judge.192  Perhaps, other 
incremental steps may be taken to move away from the untrammeled discretion of the original 
proposal. 
Yet, the lure of a clear, universal, and easily-applicable rule remains strong.  Is it possible 
to raise the sanctions for inconspicuous avoidance on an ex ante basis and without government’s 
involvement in choosing the fine in each particular case in a more or less obscure and arbitrary 
fashion?  That is, can the government leapfrog the taxpayers and increase expected penalties for 
various types of tax avoidance without knowing what they are and without a significant increase 
in enforcement costs?  As unrealistic as it sounds, the following proposal takes a step toward 
achieving these goals. 
3. A Promising Solution 
In order to reduce taxpayers’ incentives to conceal tax avoidance, we need to create a 
regime in which transactions that are difficult to detect would be subject to higher nominal 
penalties on an ex ante basis.  Easier said than done!  There are enormous variations among 
taxpayers along many different dimensions.  Take just one type of subtraction from gross 
income—a loss—as an example.  Some taxpayers are large and others are small, so a loss that 
would appear significant and stand out on one return would be entirely inconspicuous on another.  
Business and personal profiles of taxpayers differ.  A substantial farming loss would look odd on 
a suburban lawyer’s return, but not on that of a farmer.  Some businesses are going through 
periods of dramatic growth or contraction, others are stable.  Large losses on the returns of the 
former type merely reflect business realities (these are start-up losses or actual losses of a failing 
enterprise).  Similar losses on returns of a stable entity may indicate tax avoidance.  There seems 
to be nothing we can seize on to use as a measuring stick for deciding when to raise or lower 
nominal penalties.  Perhaps, this difficulty lies at the core of the existing system’s failure to 
respond to variations in probabilities of detection. 
But why do we need a measuring stick?  We need it, of course, because if we were to 
vary nominal penalties for transactions yet unknown, we need to refer to something that would 
make each particular level of nominal penalties applicable.  This is true, however, only if we 
remain bound by the rigid structure of the existing nominal penalties.  For these penalties, the 
measuring sticks are the magnitude of avoidance, its aggressiveness, and whether or not a 
transaction was disclosed on the return.  Can an ex ante penalty be devised without relying on 
measuring sticks? 
Consider again the features that are likely to raise a red flag.  Limiting the inquiry to 
subtraction items (such as a deduction, credit, or loss), auditors are likely to become suspicious 
about such an item if it is either atypical for a given taxpayer or it has changed significantly from 
the prior year or years.  Being well aware of that, a taxpayer choosing among several tax 
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avoidance strategies and looking for the one with a lower expected penalty would select a 
transaction giving rise to a subtraction of a specific type, other things being equal.  First, this will 
be a subtraction that the taxpayer already has on her return and that has some obvious 
relationship to her business or personal situation.  Second, she would prefer a subtraction that she 
already has in a relatively substantial amount (so that a change caused by the tax avoidance 
arrangement would not be dramatic).  Otherwise, a deduction or credit resulting from tax 
avoidance is likely to raise a red flag. 
Ideally, we would want a higher nominal penalty in case where a taxpayer has followed 
this logic, but not in an alternative case where probability of detection will be relatively high.  We 
can advance toward this goal by linking the size of the nominal penalty not just to the amount of 
the improperly claimed subtraction as we do now, but, in addition, to the amount of a legitimate 
subtraction of the same type (i.e., reported on the same line) on the taxpayer’s return.193 
The specific form of this linkage is open to further consideration and is discussed in 
detail below.  Whatever form is chosen, the critical feature of the proposed penalty, and the one 
that distinguishes it from any penalty existing today, is that this linkage makes it unnecessary to 
search for, and latch onto, any measuring stick.  That is, the government need not decide in 
advance what specific deduction or credit should be made subject to a higher nominal penalty—
something it cannot do with much precision in any case.194  Rather, each taxpayer’s own return 
would provide the answer.  Because the proposed penalty depends on individual circumstances of 
a particular taxpayer, in many instances it would adjust itself: it would be automatically higher 
where we would want it to be higher and lower where we would want it to be lower from the 
marginal deterrence perspective.  By raising expected penalties where they are currently at their 
lowest levels, this self-adjusting penalty would significantly increase overall deterrence.  An 
example would help to demonstrate the point. 
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 Using a similar approach to deter understatements of income does not work nearly as well.  Subtractions 
raise suspicions when they are unusual or when they increase significantly.  The apparent corollary for 
income is that absence of, and drops in, income would raise questions.  Neither prong of this corollary, 
however, is necessarily true.  While presence of, say, farm income on a doctor’s return is a bit strange, 
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the future. 
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 As Joseph Bankman put it, “[r]egulations cannot [ ] target ‘next year’s’ tax shelter . . . ,” Bankman, 
supra note 122, at 1788. 
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Consider a corporate taxpayer, say a multinational commercial bank (we’ll call it 
Interbank), choosing from two possible avoidance arrangements that, if successful, would reduce 
the Interbank’s tax bill by $1 million each.  Assume that the two strategies are equally (more or 
less) aggressive, and that it would cost Interbank the same to pursue either one.195  The first 
structure would enable Interbank to claim $1 million in foreign tax credits without bearing the 
economic burden of the related foreign tax.196  An alternative arrangement would allow the bank 
to take a $1M research credit without spending any of its funds on qualifying research 
activities.197  Under the current penalty regime, the bank is virtually certain to choose the foreign 
tax credits structure because it is much less likely to be questioned on audit.  Under the proposed 
regime, the calculation changes dramatically. 
Assume, for example, that the proposed self-adjusting penalty (the “Penalty”) is set to 
equal 10 percent of the total legitimate subtraction item reported on the same line of the return as 
the illegally claimed one.198  Assume further that the taxpayer has $100 million of foreign tax 
credits that are perfectly justified, but, having no research activities, it has no research credits 
other than those to be generated by the scheme under consideration.199  A shelter producing 
research credits would have a high probability of detection because these credits would be 
unusual for Interbank.  Even if they had an intuitive explanation, a change from zero to $1 million 
is likely to draw attention if an auditor is looking at (or if a computer is scanning) Interbank’s 
returns for multiple years.  On the other hand, the Penalty in this case would be zero: the bank 
would loose the entire $1 million of improperly claimed credits but nothing else.200  If the bank 
chooses the foreign tax credit shelter, the probability of detection will be much lower—these are 
typical subtraction items on the bank’s returns, and a difference between $100 and $101 million is 
not likely to attract auditor’s attention.  However, making an ex ante calculation, Interbank’s tax 
director would realize that if the slight chance that the transaction would be caught materializes, 
the consequences for the bank would be fairly catastrophic—it will lose $11 million of foreign 
tax credits.  Here, the Penalty is high, compensating for a low probability of detection.  As a 
                                                     
195
 These two assumptions will apply to all further examples.  For the reasons discussed in note 173 above, 
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 See I.R.C. § 901 (providing for a foreign tax credit). 
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 The bank may be subjected to some of the existing penalties, such as a 20 percent negligence penalty, 
depending on the aggressiveness of the structure. 
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result, the enticing opportunity to knock $1 million from Interbank’s tax bill without taking on 
much risk is foreclosed, and the deterrence is improved.201 
The proposed self-adjusting Penalty has several highly useful features.  First, its size 
changes without any input from the government depending on the unique attributes of each 
particular taxpayer.  One such attribute is the type of subtraction that is typical or atypical for a 
given taxpayer’s return.  For some taxpayers it is easy to hide questionable foreign tax credits, for 
others it’s depreciation deductions, research credits, interest deductions, capital losses, the list 
goes on and on.202  For instance, under the existing regime, a taxpayer with no foreign operations 
but significant research and development expenditures would prefer the arrangement generating 
research credits for the same reasons that Interbank would prefer the foreign tax credit scheme.  If 
the government has to choose on an ex ante basis whether to raise nominal penalties for one type 
of credit or the other (assuming it is unwilling to raise nominal penalties across the board), it will 
not deter both Interbank and the research-focused taxpayer no matter what it does, unless, of 
course, it adopts the self-adjusting Penalty. 
Another strength of the proposed Penalty is that it self-adjusts to the size of a particular 
taxpayer.  One of the significant weaknesses of the tax shelter Regulations is the inevitable 
administrability-based decision to make the reportable transaction categories subject to numerical 
thresholds.  Thus, only relatively large losses and book-tax differences require disclosure.203  At 
the same time, all losses and book-tax differences above the threshold must be reported.204  This 
regime fails to respond to variations in expected penalties for both large and small taxpayers.  For 
large taxpayers, even a significant loss may be relatively inconspicuous, justifying the disclosure 
burden.  Yet a different type of an equally substantial loss may raise an obvious red flag, making 
the disclosure mandated by the Regulations unnecessary.  Similarly, a much smaller loss on a 
return of a relatively small business may beg for questioning, justifying the exemption from the 
reporting rules.  But in other cases a loss of the same size may be hard to notice or may have an 
apparent explanation making scrutiny unlikely.  Yet, no disclosure obligations will arise.  The 
Penalty needs no thresholds because it automatically adjusts to each taxpayer’s scale.  The large 
taxpayer would be deterred without incurring the costs of unnecessary disclosure.  The same 
would be true for the small taxpayer even in the absence of any disclosure requirements. 
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A third attractive feature of the self-adjusting Penalty is that it works on a continuum, not 
just as an on/off switch.  This flexibility stands in contrast with the rigid existing rules that give 
taxpayers only two choices: disclose fully or don’t disclose at all.205  The Penalty gives taxpayers 
an opportunity to make marginal decisions.  It creates incentives to engage in avoidance through 
marginally more detectable transactions (although not the ones certain to be detected) because 
these transactions are subject to lower nominal penalties (albeit not the lowest possible ones).  If 
taxpayers follow this strategy, audits become more effective. 
For example, imagine a successful owner of a trendy New York city night spot operated 
as a sole proprietorship who is choosing from three equally (more or less) aggressive and costly 
opportunities to reduce her taxable income by $5,000.  She may overstate her depletion 
deduction,206 her advertising expenses,207 or her expenditures for chefs, waiters, and others 
working at the restaurant.208  Assume that the owner’s legitimate deductions of each type are $0, 
$6,000, and $60,000 respectively, and that these amounts are close to their historic averages.  An 
extra $5,000 (allegedly) spent on advertising will not be as surprising as an inexplicable depletion 
deduction,209 but will be certainly more noticeable than a $5,000 increase in compensation 
outlays.  Correspondingly, the Penalty for the additional advertising deduction ($180)210 will be 
higher than for taking a depletion deduction ($0) but lower than the one for overstating 
compensation expenses ($1,800). 
Fourth, the proposed penalty has a number of advantages over the case-by-case 
multipliers and other standard-based approaches discussed in the preceding section.  First, as any 
rule, it would be much less costly for taxpayers to learn and for courts to apply.  Second, apart 
from the cost considerations, and in contrast with a standard-like sanction, the Penalty would give 
taxpayers notice regarding the level of potential liability.  Perhaps, they would not be in a position 
to determine its exact size, but at least they would have a fairly good idea regarding the order of 
its magnitude.  Third, the Penalty would be less arbitrary from taxpayers’ point of view than the 
standard-like sanction considered earlier.  It would penalize taxpayers for using legitimate 
subtraction items to camouflage the illegitimate ones by denying a portion of the legitimate item.  
The connection between the penalty and the taxpayers’ actions is clear and intuitive.  Fourth, the 
proposed penalty would allow for no government discretion once its size is set by the legislature.  
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Hence, it will be cheaper for the government to administer and less susceptible to abuse by 
enforcement agents compared to the standard-based discretionary sanction.211 
Finally, the suggested Penalty is extremely flexible.  Its size can be easily varied.  If the 
penalty equal to 10 percent of the total legitimate subtraction item were viewed as too lenient 
(harsh), it can be easily increased (reduced).  The Penalty can be imposed either by default 
(perhaps with a limited freedom given to the IRS to waive it), or only in some circumstances 
based on taxpayer’s fault or other factors.  The Penalty need not apply to all types of avoidance.  
If it were thought beneficial (efficient, politically expedient, or for any other reason) to 
differentiate its size and/or applicability among various types of subtractions, that could be easily 
done as well.  This flexibility, while attractive, would present policymakers with difficult choices.  
I discuss the available alternatives and, in some cases, consider merits and demerits of choosing 
various specific features in the following part.  Before focusing on details, however, it is 
important to acknowledge a limitation of the proposal. 
The self-adjusting Penalty applies only to tax avoidance or evasion that involves 
overstatements of deductions, credits, or losses.  Not all tax avoidance is based on these items, 
however, and most evasion does not involve subtractions at all.  Starting with avoidance, hedging 
and monetization transactions, for example, that were popular in mid-1990s and were targeted by 
the constructive sale legislation involve arguably inappropriate non-recognition of gain.212  The 
same issue arises in corporate reorganizations, partnership transactions, securities sales and many 
other contexts.213  The proposed Penalty does nothing to deter these forms of avoidance.  Turning 
to evasion, it is well-known that although some evade by overstating subtractions,214 the most 
typical form of evasion is a failure to report income.  The Penalty would make no difference for 
taxpayers engaged in evasion of this type.  Another considerable compliance problem—
overstatement of tax basis of various capital assets215—would be similarly unaffected. 
The picture is not entirely bleak, however.  Subtraction overstatements play a significant 
role in total tax noncompliance.  The tax shelter waive of the 1970s was all about deductions.  It 
is revealing that many of the listed transactions subject to the new Regulations, including the 
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majority of the most notorious ones, involve overstatements of credits, deductions, and losses.216  
If the Penalty is effective in reducing these overstatements, it is likely to have a significant impact 
on tax avoidance.217  While the Penalty would not solve all problems, much narrower measures, 
such as the recent Regulations, are generally regarded as worth-while efforts to improve tax 
enforcement.218  Thus, the Penalty’s limited reach can hardly be the reason not to give the 
proposal a serious consideration.  Of course, devising enforcement measures that would deter the 
types of noncompliance unaffected by the proposed Penalty would be extremely useful as well. 
V. Focusing on the Details 
1. How Should the Penalty be Determined? 
Two questions about the self-adjusting Penalty arise as soon as the proposal is 
formulated.  If we are to link the Penalty to the legitimate subtraction item of a type used to avoid 
the tax, we need to decide exactly how this link should be accomplished.  That is, how do we 
define the legitimate subtraction item and what portion of that item should be denied? 
To appreciate the importance of the first question, consider a multi-national auto-
manufacturer with subsidiaries all over the globe and complicated internal financing mechanisms.  
Assume that this corporation inappropriately deducted some interest paid to its foreign subsidiary.  
What is the legitimate subtraction item on which the Penalty should be based?  Is it the entire 
interest deduction for the year, all interest paid to related parties, to foreign parties, to foreign 
related parties, some other alternative?  Or, on an entirely different scale, think of a plumber who 
overstates his investment interest deduction.  Should the Penalty be based on his entire interest 
(including mortgage interest on his personal residence and business interest), only on the 
investment interest component, some alternative combination? 
The examples demonstrates that in order to be effective, the Penalty must be carefully 
linked to the tax return.  If the line items on the return are too generic (e.g., all types of interest 
deductions are reported on a single line), a large increase in deduction for interest paid to a related 
foreign party in the first example may register only as a slight change in the total interest 
deduction, making it hard to detect.  At the same time, if the overstatement is found, the penalty 
would be very high if (as is likely to be the case) the automaker has many other interest 
deductions.  Thus, overly-generic returns would lead to very high Penalties rarely imposed.  This 
would be both highly unpopular219 and very costly.220  On the other hand, if returns are too 
specific, auditors would be overwhelmed with information.221 
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Rather than being a cause for concern, this discussion highlights an opportunity.  By 
changing the manner in which interest (or any other subtraction item) is reported the government 
can tailor the Penalty (and the taxpayer’s decisions) to reflect its concerns.  If the IRS is 
particularly worried about overstatements of interest paid to related parties, it should add a return 
line just for that interest.  This would increase probability of detection for overstating this 
particular deduction, and would also make the Penalty more sensitive to the size of this specific 
overstatement.  At the same time, the government should be careful not to over-compartmentalize 
tax returns.  Finally, because introduction of the Penalty would affect the government’s view 
about the optimal degree of specificity in tax reporting, perhaps the Penalty should not be enacted 
on a whole-sale basis.  Rather, it should be “phased-in” once the IRS determines that a particular 
item is reflected on a return at the appropriate level of generality. 
Unfortunately, the answer to the second question—how high should the Penalty be—is 
not nearly as satisfactory.  Because, as discussed above, we have no means of determining the 
optimal expected penalty, we simply don’t know what nominal penalties would result in efficient 
deterrence.  Recognizing this limitation (which applies to all tax penalties), the proposed Penalty 
aims at improving marginal deterrence, i.e., it is clearly a second-best solution.  But even beyond 
that, while the Penalty would arguably enhance marginal deterrence, it does not attempt to 
optimize it.  I make no claim that once the self-adjusting Penalty is adopted, the difference in the 
expected penalties for various forms of avoidance or evasion would be equal to the difference in 
these strategies’ external harms.  To the contrary, the proposed Penalty is virtually certain to 
over- or under-deter.222  Without bringing expected penalties to their absolutely or marginally 
optimal levels, the proposal is, at most, a third-best solution.  However, given lack of the 
economic analysis of optimal marginal deterrence, a third-best is the best we can do for now. 
The more practical considerations discussed below suggest the likely constraints on the 
magnitude of the self-adjusting Penalty.  It is worth noting at the outset, however, that we should 
not reject the Penalty just because it may be very large in some cases.  Tax law has plenty of 
provisions that lead to fairly disastrous consequences even though they are not always called 
“penalties.”  A single dollar of cash consideration converts and entirely tax-free reorganization 
into a wholly taxable one.223  A foreigner who fails to file a tax return loses all of his deductions 
and credits for the year.224  A fraudulent claiming of an earned income tax credit (no matter how 
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small in amount) is punished by denial of the credit for the following ten years.225  And how can 
we forget the $10,000 a day penalty accumulating forever?226  To be sure, the Penalty would 
apply in more cases than any of these sanctions (and probably all of them combined).  This 
generality calls for a serious deliberation in setting the Penalty’s size, not for marginalizing the 
Penalty by making it immaterially small in the vast majority of cases.  
2. Fault or No-Fault? 
In its most basic form, the self-adjusting Penalty depends only on the amount of a 
legitimate subtraction item on a taxpayer’s return.   It need not take fault into account.  Should it?  
This question raises two separate issues.  First, should the Penalty’s size vary with taxpayers’ 
fault, i.e., should it be fault-sensitive?  Second, should the Penalty be fault-based, i.e., should it 
apply, in addition to evasion, only to particularly aggressive avoidance?  This section addresses 
both issues. 
It is not immediately apparent why the Penalty should be fault-sensitive.  After all, the 
existing nominal penalties already vary depending on the aggressiveness of a given transaction.  
The self-adjusting penalty is designed to establish a similar variation based on differences in 
probability of detection—a parameter that no current penalty addresses.  As long as the proposed 
penalty compliments (rather than replaces) the existing ones, why not let each penalty deal with 
its own problem? 
Several responses come to mind.  First, by increasing the total fine, the self-adjusting 
penalty reduces the sensitivity of the overall punishment to aggressiveness of taxpayers’ 
positions.  For example, assume that a penalty is $200 for a negligent arrangement and $400 for a 
grossly negligent one, i.e., it is twice as high for a more aggressive position.  If we add a self-
adjusting Penalty of $1,000, and assuming that probability of detection is the same for both 
schemes, the total penalties will be $1,200 and $1,400 respectively.  The fine for a more 
egregious violation is now only about 17 percent larger than for a less offensive one.  Thus, if the 
Penalty is large compared to the fault-based fines, and if it does not change based on taxpayer’s 
fault, taxpayers may be under-deterred from taking more egregious positions if they respond to 
relative differences in total penalties (17 percent versus 100 percent) rather than their absolute 
amounts ($200 in each case). 
If we consider the effect of variations in the proposed Penalty (rather than its absolute 
size), the problem becomes even more acute.  Assume, for instance, that Interbank’s foreign tax 
credit structure has a very good chance of being upheld in court, and virtually no chance of 
triggering any of the current fault-based sanctions.  The research credit plan is likely to be found 
fraudulent, although only civil penalties will apply.  Under the existing rules, the highest nominal 
penalty, when added to the tax liability itself, would require Interbank to pay $1.75 million if it 
loses the research credit case.227  The self-adjusting Penalty is zero because Interbank has no 
other research credits.  If, however, the bank chooses a much less aggressive (but also much less 
detectable) foreign tax credit structure, and if the Penalty is equal to the entire  legitimate 
subtraction item (rather than 10 percent of it), Interbank would have to pay $101 million if the 
foreign tax credit is disallowed.  The two numbers are grossly disproportionate. 
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These examples suggests that, putting theoretical questions of optimal expected penalties 
aside, the existing nominal fault-based sanctions should serve as a reference point for setting the 
Penalty’s size.  Ultimately, the IRS would need to evaluate how difficult it is for its auditors to 
detect transactions that do not raise red flags compared to those that do.228  Policymakers would 
need to make a judgment comparing these difficulties with variations in taxpayers’ fault and to 
set the magnitude of the Penalty based on this judgment.  While the ultimate conclusion is far 
from certain, if one takes the current nominal fault-based penalties as a given,  it appears highly 
unlikely that a difference between $1.75 million and $101 million can be justified.  Rather, the 
Penalty equal to a relatively small fraction of the entire legitimate subtraction item appears much 
more reasonable. 
Finally, in our system where taxpayers face higher penalties for more aggressive 
schemes, a rational taxpayer would expend more efforts to conceal a more egregious transaction.  
If so, aggressiveness and probability of detection are systematically related, and it would make 
sense to reflect this relation in the structure of nominal sanctions.  Fortunately, this could be 
easily done.  All it takes is to vary the Penalty’s size based on taxpayer’s fault.  For example, the 
Penalty may be set at 5 percent of the legitimate subtraction item for non-negligent arrangements, 
10 percent for negligent ones, 15 percent for those that are grossly negligent and so on.  
Structured this way, the Penalty would take into account variations in both probability of 
detection and degree of taxpayer’s fault. 
A decision to make the Penalty fault-sensitive leaves the hardest question unresolved.  
Should it also be fault-based?  Most importantly, should it apply to those who are merely 
mistaken?229  Until this point, the Penalty has been justified as a measure that would accomplish a 
very specific goal: deter taxpayers from hiding their avoidance strategies.  If one conceptualized 
the Penalty as punishing those who engage in deliberate concealment, applying it to mistaken 
taxpayers makes no sense.  A person who, for example, took a particular deduction believing that 
it was entirely appropriate could not have possibly tried to hide from the government—she simply 
had no reason to do this.  Is there any deterrence-based justification to sanction this mistaken 
individual?  Put another way, what would be the deterrent effect of a no-fault self-adjusting 
Penalty? 
As long as the government is using the red flags audit strategy, probability of detection 
for transactions that do not raise red flags is lower whether a taxpayer deliberately structured a 
transaction to avoid detection or the transaction simply happened to be of an inconspicuous type.  
For example, assume that a Wall Street lawyer actively involved in charitable causes takes a farm 
loss under a misguided view that she is entitled to do so.  The mistake is likely to trigger an audit 
and be detected for the reasons already discussed.  If, however, the inappropriately (and 
mistakenly) taken subtraction is a charitable deduction, chances that an auditor would notice the 
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into a somewhat questionable transaction that was clearly non-negligent.  Unlike the mistaken taxpayers, 
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error are much lower.230  If taxpayers are more likely to make mistakes that reduce their taxes (as 
opposed to those that increase them),231 this example illustrates another undesirable consequence 
of the red flags strategy. 
 Under the current rules, the lawyer would face an identical penalty for either 
overstatement.  Therefore, she would have no reason to be more careful with one subtraction item 
than the other.  But the government would surely want her to pay particular attention to charitable 
deductions because their mistaken overstatements are likely to go undetected.  By extending the 
Penalty to mistaken taxpayers, the government, in essence, would be warning them: be extra 
careful with subtraction items of a certain kind because the auditors are unlikely to challenge your 
decisions.  Because the government would rely on taxpayer’s judgments with respect to these 
items more than with others, and as long as taxpayers have a notice of this reliance, punishing 
mistaken taxpayers would accomplish a valuable deterrence objective.232 
On the other hand, introducing a fault-based threshold by applying the Penalty only to 
particularly aggressive (e.g., negligent) behavior is entirely unrelated to the basic rationale of the 
proposal.  Imagine, for instance, that the lawyer’s accountants told her that the farm loss would be 
found negligent if detected while the extra charitable deduction would probably lose, but just 
barely.  If the proposed Penalty applies only to negligent actions, the lawyer would certainly 
choose to overstate the charitable deduction, just as she would today.  At the same time, if she 
already has some legitimate farm losses, yet chooses to overstate the vastly more detectable farm 
loss anyway, the Penalty would apply even though she made no attempt to hide the 
overstatement.  Thus, introducing a negligence threshold would not affect the incentives to 
conceal for a vast array of arrangements that do not meet it, and it would penalize negligent (and 
more aggressive) taxpayers even if they do nothing to hide their avoidance. 
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These unfortunate results follow not because the Penalty in the preceding example is 
made fault-dependent, but because it is made to depend on the wrong type of fault.  If we want to 
excuse mistaken taxpayers, we should apply the Penalty only to those who deliberately disguise 
their aggressive positions.  This, however, is entirely unrelated to whether these positions are 
fraudulent, negligent, or barely illegal.  Unfortunately, while the threshold of deliberate 
concealment would reflect the penalty’s core objective, it would be very difficult to implement.  
If the burden is placed on the government, how would it go about showing what taxpayer thought 
when it decided to take one type of subtraction or the other?  If the burden is placed on a 
taxpayer, how would it prove a negative (i.e., that it did not try to hide a particular subtraction, 
but just happened to take it)? 
To be sure, law frequently attaches consequences to agent’s motive, intent, or purpose.233  
Tax law boasts a business purpose doctrine and an economic substance test that incorporates an 
inquiry into taxpayer’s motivations.  These doctrines, however, produce considerable uncertainty 
despite decades-long attempts to make their application more predictable.  The factors that could 
be relevant in deducing taxpayer’s state of mind are numerous,234 the extent of prohibited intent is 
unclear,235 and as a result, transactions that the Tax Court finds so egregious as to merit penalties 
end up being upheld on appeal.236  The existing tools for inferring taxpayer’s motive or intent, 
however imperfect, would be of little use for discerning whether a taxpayer attempted to hide her 
aggressive positions because they ask a different question.  Basing the Penalty on taxpayers’ 
motivations in the absence of a developed analytical apparatus for evaluating intent to conceal 
would lead to uncertainty of a magnitude that is difficult to justify.  Thus, restricting the proposed 
Penalty to particularly aggressive substantive positions appears to be a practical, albeit decidedly 
suboptimal, way to limit the Penalty’s reach. 
In sum, a no-fault Penalty may be justified on deterrence grounds, but only if the basic 
rationale is expanded.  Introducing a fault-based threshold undermines the Penalty’s core 
deterrence objectives, but limits its reach.  Neither solution is conceptually perfect.  Thus, again, 
it is worth taking more practical considerations into account. 
Starting with a look at the existing long-standing sanctions, one sees a clear connection to 
fault.  The so-called accuracy-related penalties apply only if a taxpayer acted with a certain 
degree of carelessness or understated her tax liability by a significant amount.237  Any of these 
penalties, as well as the civil fraud penalty, are waived if a taxpayer had a reasonable cause to 
take the questionable position (i.e., if she were sufficiently innocent).238  The recently added 
penalty for understatements attributable to reportable or listed transactions, while containing no 
explicit fault-based threshold, is inapplicable if a taxpayer satisfies a stronger version of the 
                                                     
233
 See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 1, at 252-53 (enumerating some of the areas). 
234
 See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 174, at 881 (listing some of the factors). 
235
 See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 131, at 17. 
236
 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2001), reversing 113 T.C. 
214, 223 (1999). 
237
 See I.R.C. § 6662. 
238
 See I.R.C. § 6664(c). 
 49 
reasonable cause exception.239  None of these penalties would apply to a taxpayer who barely 
crossed the line. 
In contrast, many penalties added to the Code by the 2004 Act apply regardless of 
taxpayers’ fault.  If a taxpayer is found to have understated her tax liability having failed to 
disclose a reportable or listed transaction, no reasonable cause exception is available.240  Although 
in some (perhaps many) cases listed and reportable transactions with “a significant purpose . . . 
[of] the avoidance or evasion Federal income tax”241 would produce negligent understatements, 
this will not always be true, as the government was recently reminded by a court.242  Thus, even if 
a taxpayer barely loses the dispute she would have to pay a penalty equal to 30 percent of the 
understatement if she failed to disclose the transaction.243  The no-fault character of penalties for 
failure to disclose listed and reportable transactions is even clearer.  The legislative history of the 
2004 Act emphasizes that the penalties apply even if the underlying substantive position is 
ultimately sustained.244  Because there is no reasonable cause exception, a taxpayer (or advisor) 
who mistakenly failed to file a disclosure form regarding the transaction that is ultimately upheld 
would be subject to sanctions.245  Thus, even though taxpayers’ fault has been traditionally a 
prerequisite for imposition of penalties for tax avoidance, the recent Congressional actions 
suggest that it is no longer the case. 
Turning our attention from the law on the books to the realities of its application fails to 
resolve the ambiguity.  On the one hand, the rate at which IRS assesses penalties once it finds tax 
underpayments is very low.246  If limiting the proposed Penalty to actions that are at least 
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negligent means that it would apply in exceedingly few cases, we may be more inclined to make 
it no-fault.  On the other hand, the reason for the historically low penalty assessment rates may 
not be the fault-based thresholds.  Rather, the reasonable cause exception may be the culprit.  In 
fact, based on the latest government actions, it believes that the so-called penalty opinions 
designed to ensure that taxpayers would qualify for this exception are the main reason for the 
latest tax shelter crisis.247  Finally, academics and practitioners alike have suggested that the 
government routinely fails to assess penalties where it is entitled to do so.248  If the self-adjusting 
Penalty does not have a reasonable cause exception, and if the IRS actually applies it when it is 
available, the Penalty may apply in a considerable number of cases even if it is fault-based. 
Concerns about complexity and ambiguity of many tax rules and accuracy of their 
application by the IRS and courts appear to point toward establishing a fault-based threshold.  
The Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury regulations are notoriously difficult to understand 
and interpret, making their application somewhat random.  However, commentators disagree 
whether randomness helps the government or the taxpayers.  If, as David Weisbach suggests, 
larger uncertainty regarding substantive outcomes leads to a greater range of bargaining between 
taxpayers and the IRS, and if taxpayers are likely to capture most of the bargaining surplus, we 
should be less worried that the Penalty will apply in many cases.249  If, however, randomness 
introduces substantial risk-bearing deadweight losses for risk-averse taxpayers, limiting the 
Penalty’s reach may be more efficient.250  Finally, while a Penalty for a barely illegal deduction 
would appear unfair on an ex post basis, taxpayers always have an option of responding to 
complexity and legal ambiguity by taking more conservative positions with respect to 
subtractions potentially subject to a high Penalty. 
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Fairness considerations point in both directions.  On the one hand, taxpayers who use 
many different subtraction items are more likely to make a mistake than those who use only one 
or two (such as a standard deduction and a child credit).  Subjecting taxpayers in the former 
category to a potentially high Penalty appears inequitable because their use of deductions and 
credits is not tax motivated.  On the other hand, these taxpayers have numerous opportunities to 
overstate any of the multiple subtraction items they claim, many do so, and these overstatements 
go undetected precisely because they are typical.  Taxpayers taking only a standard deduction 
have no similar opportunities.  Currently, taxpayers of the latter type are at a distinct 
disadvantage.  Making the Penalty no-fault offsets this existing unfairness. 
There are two additional considerations that bear on the issue.  Both suggest that a fault-
based threshold should be added.  The first is the concern with a potential for administrative 
abuse.  During many audits examiners disagree with taxpayers (more or less strongly) regarding a 
variety of return items.  The parties usually negotiate and settle most of their disputes.  Following 
the enactment of the no-fault Penalty, an auditor would be able to pick a somewhat uncertain 
subtraction item typical for the taxpayer’s return and threaten a very large fine unless taxpayer 
cooperates on all disputed items.  Facing this kind of threat, taxpayers would likely concede all 
(or most) of the items, including those where the auditor’s position is mistaken, insufficiently 
developed, or unjustified.  In essence, this strategy would convert the self-adjusting Penalty into a 
very large fine of the most general application, going well beyond its deterrence objective, 
creating large risk-bearing losses, and increasing public distrust of the IRS.251   
This brings us to the last argument in favor of limiting the Penalty’s reach.  While the 
broadly applicable Penalty would provide stronger deterrence, studies suggest that the deterrence 
rationale fails to resonate with the general public.252  Even such deterrence-conscious individuals 
as the upper-class students at the University of Chicago Law School did not think it was 
appropriate for the government to raise nominal penalties to compensate for a relatively low 
probability of detection resulting from fewer per capita tax auditors in one state compared to 
another.  The finding suggests that adjusting nominal penalties to compensate for variations in 
probability of detection created by the government without any public justification would be 
highly unpopular.  At the same time, people may be much more willing to punish offenders who 
deliberately conceal their offenses.253  Making the Penalty fault-based is likely to provide it with 
more popular support (or less outcry) by tying it to bad behavior, even if of a wrong kind. 
In sum, it would likely be a good idea to make the self-adjusting Penalty vary depending 
on the aggressiveness of the underlying arrangement.  Whether it would be preferable to have it 
apply only to actions that cross some fault-based threshold is less clear, although that, too, 
appears to be a more practicable and politically acceptable alternative.  One solution would be to 
introduce the Penalty with a fault-based threshold and later eliminate it if the original version of 
the Penalty proves to be inadequate. 
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3. Additional Fine-Tuning Possibilities 
Policymakers may decide that it would be desirable to vary the Penalty depending on the 
nature of the benefit involved.  For example, it is widely understood that depreciation deductions 
(technically speaking, the accelerated cost recovery system) are both intended to be, and are, 
generous subsidies rather than attempts to accurately measure economic deterioration of various 
wasting assets.  In contrast, foreign tax credits are merely adjustments needed to prevent double-
taxation of income earned abroad by U.S. taxpayers.  Imposing (potentially large) Penalties for 
the schemes designed to abuse the provisions that are already highly beneficial (depreciation 
deductions) may be viewed as more justified.254  Of course, as already mentioned, nothing would 
stop Congress from enacting the Penalty only with respect to a specific types of subtraction items. 
Another possible reason to differentiate the magnitude of the Penalty would be to 
distinguish between transactions in which income is deferred or converted into a type subject to 
lower rates from those eliminating the tax altogether.  Erasing income from a return produces 
larger tax savings than converting its character or deferring it to future years.  However, because  
auditors generally review items, not transactions, they cannot easily distinguish between these 
types of arrangements.  For example, they would not know whether a given deduction is 
permanent or would produce an offsetting income inclusion later, so the probability of detection 
would not vary based on this difference.255  Assuming both deductions are inappropriately 
claimed, we would want to deter the former type more than the latter.  Setting a higher Penalty for 
subtractions that produce permanent exclusions would improve marginal deterrence.256 
A further way of fine-tuning the Penalty is to subject it to caps.257  Justifications for caps 
range from theoretical to pragmatic.  Conceptually, the government may decide that once 
probability of detection reaches a certain (very low) level, further decreases become 
inconsequential.  For instance, it may make no difference to an auditor whether Interbank’s 
overstatement of foreign tax credits by $1 million is added to $100 million or $500 million in 
legitimate tax credits.  Without a cap, a 10 percent Penalty would be $10 million in the former 
case and $50 million in the latter while the probability of detecting the violation may be 
essentially identical.  Capping the Penalty as a fixed multiple of the illegitimately claimed 
subtraction item would address the problem.  Besides, a capped Penalty is likely to be more 
politically acceptable and viewed as more fair (or less unfair) on an ex post basis. 
An alternative (or complementary) use of caps would be to make the Penalty no-fault as a 
general matter, but to cap it (perhaps at relatively low levels) for taxpayers whose actions have 
not met a negligence threshold.258  If this is done, both the narrower and the broader deterrence 
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objectives discussed earlier would be achieved to a degree, yet many concerns with imposing the 
Penalty on mistaken taxpayers would be alleviated. 
Finally, the Penalty would benefit from a safe harbor.  Because of the Penalty’s very 
essence, it will have a particularly significant impact on taxpayers’ core business and investment 
activities.  Tax shelters are frequently defined as artificially concocted schemes having no integral 
relationship to the real operations of a sheltering taxpayer.259  By definition, subjecting these 
schemes to high penalties cannot interfere with any legitimate business or investment.  The same 
is clearly not true of the self-adjusting Penalty.  It threatens taxpayers with losing deductions and 
credits that they have in large amounts, i.e., that are likely to arise from their ordinary activities.  
A penalty affecting taxpayers’ everyday decisions may be inefficient. 
First of all, this concern is not as serious as it may first appear.  The Penalty would affect 
the manner in which business activities are reported, not necessarily how they are actually carried 
out.  Moreover, even if the Penalty forces taxpayers to adjust their day-to-day operations, these 
would be the operations that made business sense only as long as they generated questionable (or 
illegal) deductions and losses before the Penalty was enacted.  Especially if the Penalty has a 
negligence threshold, these adjustments would merely ensure that taxpayers don’t violate the law 
aggressively.  Yet, in some instances tax treatment of real business or investment transactions 
may be genuinely uncertain.  Because these transactions are not tax-motivated, it would be 
inefficient if taxpayers forego them out of fear of loosing their legitimate subtractions.  To 
eliminate this inefficiency, taxpayers should be given an option to disclose these transactions to 
the IRS.260  Once a transaction is disclosed, the Penalty would not apply to it. 
The discussion in this part demonstrates that the Penalty could be easily used as an 
exceedingly flexible enforcement tool.  At one extreme, it could be enacted as a broad sanction 
applying to all subtraction items without regard to fault and with no exceptions.  At the other 
extreme, the government may start by promulgating the Penalty only for specific deductions or 
credits viewed as particularly generous and only after the IRS confirms that the given subtraction 
item is reflected on the returns at the appropriate level of generality.  The Penalty would not apply 
to mistakes and non-negligent violations, it would be capped, and taxpayers would be allowed to 
avoid it altogether through voluntary disclosure.  Perhaps, somewhere between these extreme lies 
a combination that would be both politically acceptable and sufficiently robust to put a sizeable 
dent in the amount of noncompliance carried out by hiding aggressive avoidance and evasion. 
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VI. Addressing (Some of) the Likely Objections 
1. What About Unintended Consequences? 
The discussion so far has assumed that neither taxpayers nor the government will change 
their behavior following the Penalty’s enactment, except that taxpayers will become more 
compliant because the opportunity to reduce their tax liabilities without facing high expected 
penalties will vanish.  Unfortunately (but inevitably), the parties involved may respond to the 
incentives created by the Penalty in less desirable ways.  This section considers several such 
responses and suggests potential countermeasures.261 
Starting with the government, there is a reason to worry that once the Penalty is enacted, 
the red flags strategy will be in jeopardy.  Historically, the IRS has been focused on the largest 
adjustments.262  With low nominal penalties that were rarely applied, this focus lead auditors to 
look for red flags in search of the most significant tax underpayments.  With the Penalty in place, 
this will no longer be a clearly revenue-maximizing strategy.  For instance, an auditor studying 
Interbank’s return may be troubled by a $1 million research credit that has no intuitive 
explanation.  But it would be the $100 million foreign tax credit that would really grab her 
attention.  If the auditor manages to find an understatement of that subtraction item, the reward 
will be huge. 
From the auditor’s vantage point, this is a familiar tradeoff between a low-risk, low-
reward alternative (scrutinize the research credit) and a high-stakes risky gamble (try to find a 
dollar of understatement in the foreign tax credit category within the limited time available).  If 
the auditor is risk-averse, she would not necessarily prefer the latter strategy.  However, it’s hard 
to deny that at the margin the self-adjusting Penalty would skew auditors’ decisions toward 
spending extra time on high-volume subtraction items. 
Another perverse incentive would affect a more statistically savvy examiner.  Changing 
the familiar hypothetical somewhat, imagine that Interbank has $100 million in foreign tax credits 
and another $100 million in research credits.  However, while the foreign tax credits arise from 
one gigantic payment received by the bank, the research credits come from 10 separate 
transactions of equal size.  Finally, assume that all eleven transaction have the same high 95 
percent chance of being sustained. 
The auditor’s chance of successfully disallowing the foreign tax credit are 5 percent, and 
the expected payoff from focusing the audit efforts on that credit is $5 million.263  Challenging the 
research credits is much more promising.  To see the effect of a high Penalty, assume that it is 
equal to the entire legitimate subtraction item of the relevant type.  If an auditor prevails in 
reversing the credit for any of the ten separate transactions, Interbank would lose the entire $100 
million in research credits.  The probability of that happening is a whopping 40%,264 and the 
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auditor’s expected payoff is $40 million.265  Note that even if the foreign tax credit is fairly 
questionable (say, Interbank has only 66 percent chance of prevailing on the merits), the auditor 
may still focus on the research credits instead.266 
These are certainly unintended results.  However, the situation is not as dire as it may 
first appear.  Auditors operate under considerable time constraints.  If an agent only has enough 
time to examine one or two of the ten research credit-generating transactions, her incentive to 
ignore foreign tax credits would be reduced.  In addition, being aware of the Penalty, taxpayers 
would start taking only more conservative positions where a large Penalty may apply.  Thus, 
more realistically, a chance of being sustained is likely to be higher for each of the research 
credits than for the foreign tax credit.267  Assuming auditors realize this, the urge to focus on 
research credits would be diminished.  Finally, the auditor may take into account that taxpayers 
are much more likely to contend imposition of relatively large penalties on relatively small 
understatements.  Thus, even though probability of detection in the example is equal for all 
strategies, probability of punishment may well be higher for the foreign tax credit case, further 
reducing auditor’s incentive to concentrate on research credits. 
Furthermore, keeping the Penalty relatively modest and making it fault-based would 
reduce the incentive to focus on large subtractions and, in particular, on those composed of 
numerous individual items.268  An even better response would be to change the auditors’ focus.  If 
the IRS officials insist that the auditors’ goal is to collect maximum revenue from tax 
underpayments without taking penalties into account, the proper incentives will be restored.  If 
auditors’ evaluations and promotions are made dependent on the tax (but not penalty) revenues 
collected, the auditors may well pursue the red flags strategy with the renewed vigor.269 
Just like the IRS examiners, taxpayers should be expected to adjust to the new penalty 
regime.  First, if the proposed penalty is very large, marginal deterrence may suffer.  Imagine, for 
instance, a highly successful self-employed management consultant who claims approximately 
$100,000 of legitimate travel and entertainment (“T&E”) expenses each year.270  The consultant’s 
daughter is about to get married, and he is about to spend $50,000 on this happy event.  Amidst 
the festive thoughts, it occurs to the consultant that, perhaps, if he invites a few clients to the 
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wedding, he can justify deducting $5,000 (out of $50,000) as a business expense.271  Shortly 
before the fateful day, a draconian version of the Penalty is enacted—it has no fault-based 
threshold, no caps, and it equals to the entire amount of the legitimate subtraction item.  Because 
the consultant would now lose the entire $100,000 T&E deduction whether he overstates it by 
$5,000 or $50,000, the $5,000 understatement no longer makes sense.  The consultant would 
either forego deducting any portion of the wedding outlays (the desirable result), or he just might 
decide to write off the entire cost of the wedding.  Of course, the probability of detection would 
be higher if the total T&E deduction jumps from $100,000 to $150,000 compared to a virtually 
unnoticeable difference between $100,000 to $105,000, but the incentive to raise the size of the 
bet when faced with a huge penalty even for a relatively small violation is undeniable.  The 
Penalty seems to provide insufficient marginal deterrence against more serious offenses.272 
Several measures would help to restore the balance.  First, the larger understatement is 
likely to trigger (or be subject to larger) existing fault-based penalties.  Second,  varying the 
Penalty with the egregiousness of an offense would go a long way toward strengthening marginal 
deterrence.  If the consultant would lose $10,000 in legitimate T&E deductions for a $5,000 
overstatement, but a $20,000 in these deductions for a $20,000 overstatement, he might think 
twice before writing off the entire wedding.273 
Enactment of the Penalty would eliminate some of the existing incentives in addition to 
creating the new ones.  One could argue that by threatening the use of deductions and credits that 
were enacted by Congress to incentivize (or subsidize) a particular activity or industry the Penalty 
effectively limits the intended subsidy.  This is a familiar argument against a stronger tax 
enforcement whatever form it takes.  David Weisbach’s response seems convincing.274  The 
Penalty does not affect the subsidies where they clearly apply, it only reduces their aggressive 
use.  If Congress intended a particular incentive to be used more broadly than the statute 
unambiguously states, it should clarify the provision’s scope rather than rely on taxpayers to push 
the envelope and maximize the use of a given incentive by engaging in transactions of 
questionable validity. 
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Finally, another likely response by taxpayers reflects the very essence of the proposal.  
The Penalty would affect only taxpayers who use deductions, credits, and losses to evade or avoid 
tax.  While many do so today, faced with the Penalty, taxpayers would attempt to switch to the 
types of noncompliance that it does not reach.  This, however, will be relatively difficult to do.  
So many current avoidance schemes rely on deductions, credits, and loses precisely because such 
a wide variety of possible strategies present themselves.  The number of ways to justify income 
understatements is much more limited.275  Of course, one can always understate income without 
any legal justifications.  However, it appears improbable that corporate taxpayers and wealthy 
individuals, i.e., those most likely engaged in tax avoidance, would shift to fraudulent evasion 
potentially subject to prison sentences.276  These observations suggest that elasticity of 
substituting income-understating techniques for subtraction-overstating ones may not be 
particularly high.  Nonetheless, facing the Penalty, taxpayers will redouble their efforts to find 
avoidance mechanisms of the latter type.  The government should anticipate this move and shift 
attention of its auditors more toward detecting income understatements. 
2. Are the Costs Worth the Benefits? 
As any proposal based on the economic analysis, the Penalty must withstand a cost-
benefit inquiry.  It does so quite well.  Starting, again, with the general deterrence literature, 
Becker’s original intuition that raising probability of detection is expensive while imposing 
higher monetary fines is costless277 has long been disproved.  Nominal penalties are not costless, 
and the larger sanctions are more expensive than the smaller ones.  For example, higher monetary 
fines result in more vigorous resistance from offenders, longer trials, higher attorney fees, and so 
on.278 
In addition, larger sanctions lead to social waste of a kind that is not as readily 
observable.  If offenders are risk-averse, higher monetary fines result in larger risk-bearing costs.  
These are deadweight losses—costs to offenders that produce no benefits to anyone else.279  To 
be sure, larger penalties have a stronger deterrence effect on risk-averse potential offenders, 
reducing expected penalties needed to deter a particular violation.280  However, those who decide 
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to commit the offense anyway incur risk-bearing losses solely due to the possibility, but not 
certainty, of being penalized.281  These losses increase with the size of nominal penalties. 
Compounding the inefficiency caused by risk aversion is the fact that deadweight losses 
from risk-bearing are incurred not only by offenders, but also by those whose actions remain 
within the bounds of the law.  Ambiguity inevitable in any legal system makes it difficult to 
determine whether a given behavior falls on the “right” side of the line, making actions that do 
not violate any laws risky.  In addition, a possibility of a mistaken prosecution, a corrupt 
administrator who abuses the system, incorrect application of a legal rule, or inadequate 
assistance of counsel mean that there is a chance that penalties would be imposed on innocent 
individuals.282  The higher the nominal penalties, the more worrisome they are to those who do 
not commit any offenses, the larger are their risk-bearing costs resulting from legal uncertainty 
and imperfect enforcement. 
In sum, while costs of increasing probability of punishment are obvious and 
substantial,283 scholars have identified significant, if somewhat less apparent, costs associated 
with raising nominal penalties.  These findings put to rest the idea that the most efficient 
deterrence will be achieved by maximizing the magnitude of fines. 284  Rather, the objective is to 
achieve a desired expected penalty while minimizing the sum of the costs of larger sanctions and 
higher likelihood that they will be imposed.285 
These insights have been incorporated in the tax compliance literature.  However, the 
difference between evasion and pollution discussed earlier presents yet another issue.  The only 
way of eliminating the harm of pollution is to eliminate the pollution itself.  In contrast, because 
the harm of evasion is redistributive, the government can diminish it without countering the 
evasion by raising taxes or cutting spending by the amount evaded.286  Thus, when dealing with 
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tax noncompliance as opposed to torts or pollution, we need to optimize the costs of at least three, 
not just two, possible responses.287 
Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki, building on earlier research, observed that any of 
these responses may be carried out in many different ways.288  But whatever the government does 
to marginally increase tax collections, the measure is likely to bring in less revenue than it would 
have raised if no changes in the system took place on account of the reform.  The marginal tax 
increase resulting from the incremental reform is a private cost to taxpayers.  They would react in 
different ways (including evasion, avoidance, planning, and real responses) to counter the change 
and reduce this cost.  Because on the margin, taxpayers would expend one dollar (as a direct 
outlay, utility loss, or some combination of the two) to save a dollar in additional tax,289 the 
difference between the hypothetical marginal revenue assuming no taxpayer response and the 
actual marginal revenue raised from the reform is a cost of that reform, or its total deadweight 
loss.  By comparing this deadweight loss to the marginal revenue raised reduced by the 
administrative cost of raising it (i.e., by calculating what Slemrod and Yitzhaki call the “marginal 
efficiency cost of funds” (MECF)) we could determine how efficient any measure is in raising 
additional revenue.  Thus, we can compare whether at the margin it would be more efficient to 
increase penalties, raise audit rates, enhance audit effectiveness, or take any number of other steps 
by calculating and comparing their respective marginal efficiency costs of funds. 
The MECF model is promising.  The actual and hypothetical marginal revenues may be 
estimated and marginal administrative costs may be measured, giving us at least a rough value of 
the deadweight loss and MECF.290  Even if these calculations are imprecise (as they will certainly 
be), just knowing the magnitude of the MECF values for various measures would go a long way 
toward eliminating the plainly inefficient alternatives.  Clearly, the MECF model is much closer 
to being of practical significance than the economic theory of optimal tax deterrence.  However, it 
remains to be seen when (and whether) it will be developed to the point when it can be used in 
practice.  Until then, it appears reasonable to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the proposed 
Penalty by making qualitative comparisons to the existing ones. 
These comparisons make the Penalty look quite attractive.  While calculating marginal 
costs of various enforcement strategies remains a task for the future, it is fairly clear today that 
these costs depend on the precision of the enforcement effort.  The lower the precision, the higher 
the costs.  Consider the administrative costs incurred by the government in raising probability of 
detection across the board.  Increasing audit rates for all taxpayers is very expensive, and so is 
covering very broad categories of transactions by the new Regulations.  On the other hand, 
conducting narrowly targeted audits and requiring disclosure of only specifically defined (i.e., 
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listed as opposed to reportable) transactions is much less costly.  The better the government 
knows what exactly is it looking for, the cheaper it is for the government to find it.291 
The correlation between the precision of the enforcement effort and its cost remains 
strong if we broaden the inquiry beyond administrative costs.  Audits, for example, impose 
considerable compliance costs on taxpayers, both tangible (time and effort to produce records, 
interact with the auditor, hire an accountant, etc.) and intangible (most of those who have been 
audited report that the experience is not pleasant).292  If most of the audited taxpayers have 
engaged in no avoidance or evasion, and, as a result, the government is perceived as incapable of 
finding noncompliant taxpayers, these costs are largely wasted.293  The same point is true for the 
compliance costs of forcing taxpayers to disclose numerous unobjectionable transactions under 
the new Regulations. 
This analysis applies to nominal penalties as well.  Penalties produce risk-bearing losses 
assuming taxpayers are risk-averse.  They also lead to larger administrative costs and avoidance 
costs (i.e., resources spent on planning, executing, and defending tax avoidance and evasion 
strategies).  It is well recognized that all of these costs increase with the size of nominal penalties.  
But it is also highly likely that these costs are larger for penalties of more general application 
compared to the more narrowly focused sanctions simply because the broadly applicable penalties 
affect more taxpayers. 
For example, recently enacted penalties for engaging in listed transactions are of little 
concern to a taxpayer whose tax planning is clearly not covered by the lists.  However, the same 
taxpayer may be quite worried whether her tax strategies would be subject to a negligence penalty 
that applies regardless of a particular technique used to reduce tax liability.  If so, just as with 
increasing probability of detection, it would be cost-effective to raise nominal penalties as 
narrowly as possible.  The problem, of course, is that achieving precision is extremely difficult in 
either case because the government does not have nearly enough information about the available 
tax-reduction strategies. 
The self-adjusting Penalty is attractive from the cost-benefit perspective because it raises 
nominal penalties (reducing the need for a costly imprecise increase in probability of detection), 
and it does so in a narrowly targeted way (limiting the risk-bearing and other losses resulting 
from higher imprecise nominal penalties).  While taxpayers have many different items on their 
returns, they would not be particularly concerned with facing the Penalty with respect to many of 
these items that are present in relatively small amounts.  While they would worry about large 
items, this is an inevitable price of improved deterrence. 
As long as the auditors use the red flags approach, the government is always more 
concerned about the arrangements producing subtractions that are buried in the returns among 
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large subtractions of the same type.  This is so not only because these transactions are more likely 
to be aggressive, although this seems to be a reasonable assumption if one believes that taxpayers 
try to conceal tax avoidance.  In addition, the IRS should be concerned with these transactions 
because it knows in advance that the likelihood that they would be examined is small.  That is, 
even if the IRS could magically force taxpayers to spread their avoidance strategies evenly across 
the return items, Becker’s formula would still suggest that nominal penalties should be higher for 
items that are less likely to be questioned, i.e., for items that do not raise red flags.  Thus, while 
the imprecision of the existing penalties is caused by government’s imperfect information 
regarding taxpayer’s tax structuring, the precision of the self-adjusting Penalty is based in part on 
the government’s (nearly) perfect information about its own auditing strategy.294 
Another way to highlight the Penalty’s cost-effectiveness would be to re-articulate the 
reason underlying the red flags strategy.  Auditors use it because it makes finding avoidance 
easier, that is less costly.  By hiding their aggressive positions, taxpayers make things difficult for 
the government, i.e., they impose additional external costs.  The general deterrence literature has 
long recognized that offenders should be forced to internalize the costs they impose on others.295  
The self-adjusting Penalty does exactly that.296  On balance, then, the Penalty’s higher risk-
bearing costs appear to be an entirely reasonable price to pay for improved deterrence. 
3. Should We Wait a Little? 
Taxpayers and their advisors are just coming to terms with the brave new world of 
increased disclosure and sanctions following the enactment of the Regulations and the 2004 Act.  
The Treasury Department has recently imposed new and wide-ranging requirements on any 
practitioner giving tax advice related to transactions with a tax avoidance purpose.  Failure to 
comply with these rules may lead to monetary fines, censure, and other highly unpleasant 
consequences.297  There is a wide-spread sentiment among taxpayers and their advisors that the 
government has already overreacted.298  Even a high-ranking Treasury official suggested that 
Congress should pause in its attempts to curb tax noncompliance and give the recent measures 
time to work.299  In this environment, one (and, perhaps, the most immediate) reaction to any 
proposal to strengthen tax enforcement is that the proposal is premature.  Should we just wait and 
see whether the measures already put in place would be sufficient?  To answer this question, we 
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need to consider whether these measures are likely to be effective and, if they are, whether they 
would address the problem that animates the case for the self-adjusting Penalty. 
No doubt, backed by the recently enacted penalties, the new disclosure rules increase 
probability that a particular reportable transaction will be detected.300  For listed transactions, this 
probability approximates one.301  Duties imposed on advisors involved in tax avoidance 
transactions further increase probability of detection.302  In fact, this probability may now be so 
high that the IRS need not use the red flags approach to examine transactions subject to the new 
disclosure rules.  If so, the Penalty would be in fact superfluous for these transactions. 
However, policymakers should not rest on their laurels just yet.  Trouble is, not all tax 
avoidance is subject to the Regulations.  The number of reporting triggers is limited.303  The so-
called “angel lists” exclude from reporting large categories of transactions that would have been 
covered by the Regulations otherwise.304  The lists were not short to begin with, and the IRS has 
expanded them over time.305  Finally, the reportable transaction categories are subject to various 
numerical thresholds.306 
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Moreover, the share of avoidance that is outside of the government’s new disclosure net 
is certain to grow.  The Regulations necessarily create incentives that will reduce their 
effectiveness.  They give taxpayers strong motivation to shift to new tax planning strategies that 
would not need to be reported.  Because the reportable transaction definition reaches many tax-
minimizing arrangements, avoiding the Regulations would be difficult at first.  However, this 
difficulty is unlikely to persist.  While the scope of the reportable transaction definition is broad, 
the world of conceivable avoidance strategies using various subtraction items is much broader.  In 
fact, the Joint Committee on Taxation has already come up with a list of new categories it 
believes to be characteristic of tax avoidance.307  Given time and effort—and both are certain to 
be oversupplied—taxpayers will find a way around the Regulations.  Of course, the government 
can adjust the list of triggers, modify the thresholds, and revise the angel lists to reflect new 
information.  These responses, however, would be delayed, perhaps significantly, given 
government’s inertia and lack of resources. 
Returning to our examples, we may safely assume that the Regulations and other recent 
enforcement initiatives have made a meaningful difference for Interbank and the auto-
manufacturer.  But the management consultant hoping to write off a portion of his daughter’s 
wedding bill, the lawyer padding her charitable deductions, the plumber overstating his 
investment interest, and the restaurateur taking an aggressive view of what counts as an 
advertising or compensation expense are unlikely to be affected.  They are less visible, but by no 
means a less significant part of the tax compliance problem we need to solve.  Besides, even 
Interbank and the automaker are likely to discover structures that would give them the benefit of 
various subtraction items without triggering the disclosure requirements before long.  Because the 
self-adjusting Penalty would affect the cost-benefit analysis of all these taxpayers, the recent 
enforcement measures hardly provide a reason to delay its enactment. 
VII. Conclusion 
Tax noncompliance continues to be a serious problem.  It is abundantly clear that 
reinforcing existing measures (e.g., raising existing penalties or audit rates) holds little promise.  
We need new approaches, creative thinking, and deliberate risk-taking in devising innovative 
ways to strengthen tax enforcement.  The government’s recent responses to the tax shelter 
problem reflect this view. 
Economic theory of deterrence necessarily relies on abstract models.  Attempts to bring 
this theory to bear on practical solutions, such as the one made in this article, highlight the 
theory’s considerable indeterminacy.  Until this uncertainty is resolved or substantially reduced, 
we have to wait with devising first-best tax enforcement policies.  At the same time, it is clear 
that economic models offer numerous valuable insights for which we should find (or at least try 
to find) practical applications.308  Instead of using uncertainty to justify inaction, we should rely 
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on the clear implications of the deterrence theory to detect and reform the features of the current 
tax administration that are definitely undesirable. 
This article has identified a considerable weakness in the existing enforcement regime.  A 
failure to counter taxpayers’ incentives to hide their aggressive transactions induces wasteful 
behavior, increases the welfare cost of noncompliance, and lowers overall deterrence.  Moreover, 
taxpayers’ ability to deceive the government is hardly uniform.  Millions earn only income 
subject to withholding or information reporting, take a standard deduction, and have no 
opportunities to reduce their tax liabilities.  Millions of others receive income not subject to any 
monitoring regime, take numerous deductions that are unlikely to be examined, and, in some 
cases, benefit from highly sophisticated and expensive advice.  Taxpayers in this second category 
have endless opportunities to conceal their aggressive transactions, and many take full advantage 
of these opportunities.  As a result, these taxpayers shift billions of dollars of the total tax burden 
to those in the first group.  In addition to being inefficient, this state of affairs is manifestly unfair. 
The proposed self-adjusting Penalty aims at leveling the playing field.  It is not a perfect 
solution, it will not produce optimal marginal deterrence, and in some instances, it may appear 
unfair, excessive, or flat out draconian to those who have to pay it.  Yet, the Penalty will clearly 
reduce the undesirable incentives to hide and raise the overall deterrence.  Moreover, it will 
narrow the gap in tax avoidance and evasion opportunities that can be profitably exploited by 
different types of taxpayers, reducing the clear inequity that pervades our tax system today. 
